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STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 2013:
Creating an enabling environment
The synthesis report
Our mission:
CIVICUS is an international alliance dedicated to strengthening citizen action and 
civil society throughout the world.
Our vision:
A worldwide community of informed, inspired, committed citizens engaged in 
confronting the challenges facing humanity.
About CIVICUS
We’re CIVICUS, the only global network dedicated to enhancing the rights, freedoms, health and vitality 
of civil society as a whole. We’ve worked for two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society 
throughout the world. We have a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the 
creation of a more just and equitable world. We believe a healthy society is one where people have multiple 
opportunities to participate, come together and express their voices.
We’re a membership network, with our alliance encompassing a geographically and thematically diverse, and 
growing, membership, complemented by a wide range of partnerships with global, regional, national and local 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and other parts of civil society, and with governments, donors and other 
institutions.
We work by convening and networking, researching and analysing, generating and sharing knowledge, and 
communicating, campaigning, inﬂuencing and advocating. In everything we do, we partner.
Join our growing alliance
Solutions begin when people rise and join together, and speak up. Solutions advance when active citizens 
convince those with power to accept responsibility for their social, political and environmental impacts. 
They endure when government, business and civil society establish permanent institutional arrangements to 
ensure that we are all empowered when we allocate resources and opportunities.
Today, we have members in more than 100 countries. But we know we have only touched the surface of the 
inexhaustible reservoir of civic solidarity. We ask you to make us even stronger, so that in turn we can amplify 
your voice for change.
If you like what you’ve read in our report, please join us now. If you’re concerned about the challenges of the 
world, if you’re involved in a campaign, if you want to make a change, then we invite you to take the next 
step to help us carry forward the work of building a politics of unity and inclusion.
Become an active global citizen. Add your voice to the global movement for transformational change. Join 
us: www.civicus.org/join
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Foreword by Cathy Ashton
A vibrant and independent civil society is an essential ingredient of effective and stable democracy. The EU 
has for many years sought to incorporate the input and views of civil society in its foreign policy.
During my mandate, I have ensured that civil society remains a central pillar of our external relations. Civil 
society organisations are our partners when advocating for human rights around the globe or designing 
programmes for women’s empowerment. Today, we fund a wide array of NGOs and seek the views of civil 
society organisations both at headquarters and in the ﬁeld. On my trips overseas, I meet NGO representatives 
to hear from them how they see political as well as economic developments on the ground.
In Brussels, I have sought to ensure that the EU engages civil society in a more systematic way; in 2012, 
European foreign ministers adopted conclusions on Europe’s engagement with civil society in external 
relations, thus renewing EU policy in support of civil society.
It is precisely because of the importance of civil society to European foreign policy that I am growing 
increasingly concerned about the efforts of some states to bar, constrict, or control the work of NGOs. In too 
many cases, the voices of civil society are being stiﬂed and the space in which they can express their views 
is shrinking. This is happening through overt means of oppression such as the implementation of restrictive 
laws and the persecution of activists, as well by marginalising civil society in national and international 
decision-making processes.
I commend the environmentalists, lawyers, donors, researchers, academics, activists, political representatives 
and trade unionists who speak out for the good of their country. For civil society to prosper it needs an enabling 
environment: institutional structures, laws, policies as well as tolerant societies and resources. In short, a vibrant 
civil society is a mark of what I call ‘deep democracy’ – the key to any country’s prosperity and peace.
 
 
Cathy Ashton
Baroness Ashton of Upholland
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union
5Let’s ﬁnd our inner ﬁre once more
Citizens always know better than the government or the market what works for them. The question is whether 
our political and economic elites are prepared to listen. And all of us in civil society should understand that 
as well, too.
My most important lessons after a life of activism were learnt from marginalised communities and migrant 
workers living in the most brutal of conditions in mines and factory hostels. Many were illiterate but from 
them I learnt to listen, to listen carefully and digest their wisdom, which helped me co-create a vision and 
strategy that eventually became a mighty movement and the pillar of our ﬁght for freedom in South Africa.
I learnt that those in power only respected us when we had power. And we only had power when we 
painstakingly organised our communities, workers, women, students and faith-based organisations around 
their bread-and-butter issues. None of those truths is different today: our role as activists is only catalytic. 
Success is only possible and sustainable when local leadership arises and people own and lead their own 
struggles. And every experience, victory or failure, must be seen as a lesson, too. Our role is to hear the voices 
and struggles of the grassroots we claim to represent, and make them heard on a global platform.
Today, as we stand at the edge of a precipice, we see a growing ferment in the world. It is this alienation and 
disconnect between leaders and citizens that has led people to taking to the streets; from the historic Arab 
Spring to ﬁerce student battles for free education in Chile and Quebec, to the anti-corruption battles in India 
and the deadly struggle for a decent wage of the Marikana mineworkers in South Africa.
The obscene, rising poverty and inequality is fuelling social tensions, and in the absence of credible grassroots 
structures, violence has become the only language people feel will get their leaders to listen. Today, a new 
apartheid divides a global rich and predatory minority from the overwhelming majority’s growing poverty, 
joblessness and social inequality.
The State of Civil Society 2013 afﬁrms that empowered and informed citizens are our strongest battalions in 
our ﬁght for good governance and social justice. This is a truism that is largely ignored by the bureaucracies, 
corporations, public sector or even civil society sometimes.
 
Foreword by Jay Naidoo
6Below are some key trends to consider, as highlighted in the report:
• A shocking 57% of the world’s population live in countries where basic civil liberties and political freedoms 
are curtailed.
• In fragile and conﬂict-ridden states, civil society groups speaking out against entrenched patriarchy and 
religious fundamentalism are increasingly becoming targets of armed groups.
• Communities that traditionally relied on rivers, forests and communal grazing grounds for their subsistence 
are faced with being displaced by big corporations – including extractive industries, construction ﬁrms and 
agri-businesses.
• With the lines between business and politics blurring, we are increasingly seeing civil society voices being 
relegated to the margins in discussions on the post-2015 agenda and other global matters.
Organised civil society needs deep introspection and to realign itself with people’s needs and their voices, 
and to rebuild our legitimacy and trust with our people.
We have to return to the hard, painstaking work of organising our people and creating the tools that they are 
able to use to strengthen our ﬁght for social justice and social solidarity
The report reminds us that new approaches to social transformation must harness the reinforcing nature of 
innovation, social connectedness and positive identities.
In the Millennium Declaration world leaders stated that “men and women have the right to live their lives 
and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice.” We 
need to hold them to it. We need to focus on the world we want, build our set of demands for an enabling 
environment for civil society, campaign in a focused and concerted way by building a broad-based coalition. 
A key to the “better future” we have promised the generations which follow us rests in our courageous and 
fearless leadership today.
We dare not fail.
 
 
Jay Naidoo
Chair of the Board of Directors and Chair of the Partnership 
Council of the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
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Introduction
I write this introduction at the end of my third month at CIVICUS. In this time, my conversations with 
colleagues, members and partners all around the world reveal a serious inconsistency. Just as we are seeing 
a consensus about the importance of civil society, we are seeing developments that undermine the ability 
of citizens to come together and shape the world around them. This inconsistency is explored in this report.
Governments, international agencies and businesses increasingly recognise that a free and vibrant civil society 
is a fundamental building block of democratic societies and a means to promoting economic development. 
Recent international agreements, such as those on development effectiveness or on protecting human rights 
defenders, reafﬁrm this consensus, while every politician I have encountered in recent months seems deeply 
committed to unlocking citizen potential.
Yet the reality seems very different. The conditions in which civil society operates – the enabling environment 
as it is referred to in our report – are shaky at best and deteriorating in many parts of the world. Our report 
catalogues a litany of threats to civil society, from outright violence against civic leaders to legal restrictions 
on civil society organisations to dramatic funding cuts.
While I recognise why so many colleagues – and indeed, many of the contributors who helped us prepare 
this report - are pessimistic about the state of civil society today, I am convinced that there is only one way 
for this discrepancy to be resolved. People power will prevail.
History teaches us that it is futile for governments to curb people’s freedoms. It is a question of when, not 
if, citizens rise up to challenge and often overthrow political systems in which their rights are curtailed. New 
technologies are making it easier to access information, connect with other like-minded people, and mobilise 
large numbers of people. We also know that civil society is more trusted than governments or business, and 
that civil society groups – big and small – are ﬁnding innovative ways of improving societies across the world.
Through publications like this and through all of our other activities, CIVICUS promotes the importance of 
civil society. We speak out when civic space is threatened, and we try to ﬁnd new ways of helping civil society 
around the world do its job better. If you are not already part of the CIVICUS family, I urge you to join us.
The last year may have been grim for civil society around the world, but I am convinced that the 21st century 
will be the century of citizen participation. Watch this space.
Dr Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah
Secretary General and Chief Executive
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
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Abbreviations and acronyms
AAA Accra Agenda for Action – agreement of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in September 2008
AGNA Afﬁnity Group of National Associations – an international network of CSO umbrella bodies convened by CIVICUS
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations, a regional intergovernmental organisation
AU African Union, a regional intergovernmental organisation
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development – Australia’s development donor agency
AWID Association for Women’s Rights in Development – an international civil society organisation
BPD Busan Partnership for Development – the outcome document of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
BRICS The Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa group of countries, which have a formal relationship and are 
recognised as emerging powers
CARICOM Caribbean Community, a regional intergovernmental organisation
CBO Community-based organisation, a type of civil society organisation
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency – Canada’s development donor agency, now part of the Canadian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
CIVICUS CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CPDE CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness, the CSO coalition formed to follow up on the Busan Partnership for 
Development
CSI CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a civil society self-assessment project
CSO Civil society organisation
CSR Corporate social responsibility
CSW CIVICUS Civil Society Watch, a project to monitor the space for civil society
DAC Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which 
brings together most government development donors
Danida Denmark’s development cooperation activities
DfID Department for International Development, the UK’s development donor agency
DPO Disabled persons’ organisation, a type of civil society organisation
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EC European Commission – the executive body of the European Union
EE Index CIVICUS Civil Society Enabling Environment Index, a new quantitative tool to measure conditions for civil society 
in different countries
EU European Union, a regional intergovernmental organisation
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FBO Faith-based organisation, a type of civil society organisation
g7+ A group of governments of fragile and conﬂict-affected states
G8 A forum for the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and USA
HLF4 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, South Korea, November/December 2011
HRC United Nations Human Rights Council
HRD Human rights defender
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICNL International Center for Not-for-Proﬁt Law, an international civil society organisation
ICTs Information communication technologies
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
9IFIs International ﬁnancial institutions
IFP International Forum of National NGO Platforms, a network of national level CSO platforms
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International non-governmental organisation, a type of civil society organisation
INTRAC International NGO Training and Research Centre, an international civil society support CSO
ITU International Telecommunications Union
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation, the global body for trade unions
LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex
LTA Legitimacy, transparency and accountability
MDGs Millennium Development Goals, eight global development goals that were supposed to be achieved by 2015
MENA The Middle East and North Africa region
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a development plan for Africa introduced in 2001
NGO Non-governmental organisation, a type of civil society organisation
Norad Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norway’s development donor agency
NPO Not-for-proﬁt organisation, used in some contexts as a synonym for civil society organisation
OAS Organisation of American States, a regional intergovernmental organisation
ODA Ofﬁcial development assistance – funding provided by government development donor bodies
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental organisation of 34 countries, in 
which most development donor governments are represented
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference, an intergovernmental organisation of states with high Islamic populations
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an intergovernmental organisation of North American, 
European and former Eastern Bloc and Soviet countries
PG Participatory governance
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RBM Results-based management
Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 2012
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sweden’s development donor agency
SMS Short message service – mobile phone text message
UAE United Arab Emirates
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organisation
UPR Universal periodic review process of the UN Human Rights Council, in which countries’ human rights performance 
are reviewed
USAID US Agency for International Development, the USA’s development donor agency
UNSC UN Security Council
UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution
VfM Value for money
WFP World Food Programme
WHRD Women’s human rights defenders
WHO World Health Organisation
WSF World Social Forum, a regular gathering of a wide range of civil society
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Deﬁning civil society
CIVICUS has long used a working deﬁnition of civil society 
as being “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the 
market, which is created by individual and collective actions, 
organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.” A 
key principle to add to our working deﬁnition is that citizen 
action should be voluntary, rather than through compulsion.
While many of our contributions, being authored by people 
who hold key positions in  CSOs and networks, focus on the 
conditions in different contexts for CSOs, we need to bear in 
mind that civil society means more than its organised forms.
CSOs in all their forms – including non-governmental 
organisations, community groups, faith-based organisations, 
trade unions, informal groups (those without constitutions, 
boards and other organisational trappings), and many other 
associational forms, are part of civil society. Beyond this, 
individual activists, including online activists, artists and 
writers and human rights defenders, when they act in the 
public sphere to advance or defend a viewpoint that others 
may share, are part of civil society too. This deﬁnition suggests 
that the arena for civil society is ﬂuid and dynamic: groups 
and individuals can move in and out of it, and be within civil 
society and other spheres simultaneously.
Our working deﬁnition suggests we need to acknowledge 
that the concerns of civil society go far beyond those 
conventionally considered to revolve around human rights, 
social justice and development. The term ‘civil society’ 
also captures a group of people meeting to defend a local 
transport route from closure or volunteering to clean up a 
communal area, an online community seeking recognition for 
itself or a sports or recreational club bringing together people 
who share an interest. However, we in the CIVICUS alliance 
take particular interest in those civil society forms that seek 
to improve people’s lives and advance progressive agendas.
Deﬁning the enabling environment
For CIVICUS, enabling civil society is why we are here. 
We believe societies are healthier and people live more 
fulﬁlled lives when there are multiple opportunities for self-
expression, dialogue and exchange. There must be diverse 
spaces and places where people can come together to ﬁnd 
points of consensus and work collectively. Our pluralist vision 
is only possible when there is a wide range of civil society 
organisations and movements and individuals that are able 
to act freely.
However, we know that the enabling environment for civil 
society can be a difﬁcult concept to deﬁne, understand and 
explain.
In this report, we take the environment for civil society to 
mean the conditions within which civil society works: if civil 
society is an arena, the environment is made up of the forces 
that shape and inﬂuence the size, extent and functioning of 
that arena. In the report, we try to set out some key aspects 
that can be examined to determine the extent to which the 
environment for civil society is enabling or disenabling, and 
identify some further areas for investigation.
Restrictive conditions, which examples from our contributors 
make clear exist in many countries, make it harder for civil 
society groups to exist, function, grow and offer their best 
possible contribution to society: they are disenabling. 
However, enabling conditions must be understood to go 
beyond the simple absence of restriction, to encompass a set 
of conditions that actively help civil society to function and 
thrive. These could include having good connections between 
different civil society forms, adequate resourcing, widespread 
acceptance of the role of civil society, sustained spaces for 
inclusive dialogue with governments, and laws and regulations 
that make civil society operations easy and straightforward. 
As we will see in this report, this is not an exhaustive list.
 
Working deﬁnitions used in this report
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1. Where are we?
a. A global context of uncertainty
The 2013 CIVICUS State of Civil Society report comes within 
a global context that poses considerable challenges for civil 
society, as well as offering some opportunities. Economic crisis 
continues to affect the publics and governments of many 
countries, not least those of Europe and North America, where 
it has impacted on their governments’ engagements with 
developing countries, and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and, to a lesser extent, South Africa); it has also 
fostered food and fuel price volatility, higher unemployment 
and slides back into poverty, which have unravelled some of 
the development gains made in earlier years in developing 
countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East and North Africa,1 and helped to provoke mass 
dissent and demands for change.2 In several European and 
North American countries, we are seeing increased awareness 
of the phenomenon of the ‘squeezed middle’. Wage stagnation 
and the eroding of labour standards mean that people who 
would once have been considered secure feel that although 
they are working hard and holding down jobs, they are now 
struggling to make ends meet – a feeling long familiar to the 
world’s poor. Again, this is fuelling unrest and increasing the 
likelihood of people turning to political solutions beyond those 
offered by established parties and platforms, as elections have 
reﬂected recently in Greece and Italy. Discourse on inequality 
has arguably become commonplace, with the 1% vs. the 99% 
meme entering mainstream public consciousness.
As with poverty and limited access to development, the 
impacts of these shifts are experienced most profoundly by 
the poorest and most vulnerable people. Indeed, many people 
live on the tightest of margins, and are also at risk of exposure 
to small-scale but devastating disasters. Citing the fact that 
over 50% of the world’s population now live in cities, the 
contribution to our report from Terry Gibson, Operations 
Director of the Global Network for Disaster Reduction 
(GNDR) also warns of the dangers of social tensions, economic 
pressures and human-created and natural disasters associated 
with unplanned overdevelopment.
b. So what has changed since our last 
report?
In our report last year, we hoped that the great people’s 
movements seen in the Arab Spring and the Indignados and 
Occupy movements could represent a decisive break from 
the past. CIVICUS and many other civil society organisations 
and movements believed that democracy and people’s 
participation in the countries that experienced the Arab 
Spring would take root. This is not to deny that some gains 
have been made in some countries as a result of changes 
that the Arab Spring brought. Also, considerable efforts have 
been made, for example in the US and Greece, to localise the 
Occupy and Indignados movements to focus on community-
level activity. But as documented in various contributions to 
our report,3 much of the global civil society euphoria of the 
Arab Spring has now been lost amid the chaos, corruption and 
clampdowns on civil society that ensued.
A year on from the renaissance of dissent
What followed included a range of negative events that make 
the work of civil society harder. These included backlash 
from security forces, community level and sectarian violence, 
the imprisonment of activists, a continuing brutal conﬂict 
in Syria and political setbacks for the cause of women’s 
empowerment, for example in Egypt. As our contribution 
from Front Line Defenders tells us:
“2012 conﬁrmed what had started to emerge at the end of the 
previous year: the Arab Spring gave hope to millions of people 
in virtually every country of the region, but to date it has only 
brought limited real change.”
It is on this basis we can say that what is happening in Egypt 
and Tunisia can no longer be called revolutions: a revolution 
is when the political interests of people who lead the protest 
that unseats a regime are manifested in new power structures 
and when old, oppressive structures are overturned. In these 
countries, we see new elites with interests far removed from 
those that motivated protests beneﬁting from entrenched 
autocratic structures.
Of course repression was not limited to those countries with 
frustrated revolutions. The background noise for civil society 
in 2012 and early 2013 came in the form of continuing uses 
of legislation and policy, combined with attacks in political 
rhetoric and physical attacks, to push back against a range 
of CSOs across a wide sweep of countries. This included 
many outside the Middle East and North Africa, as we discuss 
further below.
Missed opportunities at the multilateral level?
Meanwhile, many of the vast range of CSOs and others in 
civil society that invested precious resources in the Rio+20 
process emerged disappointed at the lack of ambition of its 
outcomes. In June 2012, CIVICUS’ verdict on Rio+20 was that:
“Many of these are leaving Rio with disappointment, anger and 
a sense that a pivotal opportunity has not been fully seized… 
Rio+20 tells us deﬁnitively that the multilateral system as it 
stands is no longer ﬁt for purpose, and needs a major overhaul.”4
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Civil society is now investing considerable energy and 
resources in trying to inﬂuence the post Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) framework. Although some gains 
have undoubtedly been made in recent years as a result 
of concerted and collective civil society effort, overall the 
existing global development framework is still critiqued by 
many CSOs for being a top-down imposition, characterised 
by unequal relationships between rich and poor countries 
and with little recognition of civil society’s inclusion, role and 
contribution in development.5 At CIVICUS, we advocate that 
development has to go hand in hand with democracy and 
human rights. There are valid concerns among civil society 
that the post-2015 agenda is being seen more in terms of 
an enabling environment for economic growth than one 
that enhances good governance, people’s participation and 
democratic oversight.6 Processes, which are not inclusive, 
are already well underway to deﬁne post-2015 development 
goals. The fear must be that the disappointment in multilateral 
processes, which civil society has come to know only too well, 
is experienced again.
The continuing rise of the BRICS
It is increasingly clear to many in civil society that the 
functioning of multilateral institutions, and particularly UN 
agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions, which came 
into existence at the beginning of the Cold War, has not 
adjusted to a changing world with shifting centres of power. 
We continue to see the rise of a cluster of large countries that 
enjoy growing political and economic clout, and inﬂuence 
over their neighbouring countries. At the heart of this cluster 
are the BRICS countries.
One potentially positive recent outcome from the BRICS bloc 
may come in the form of the eThekwini Declaration, issued by 
the BRICS summit held in Durban, South Africa in March 2013. 
This announced the launch of a BRICS Development Bank for 
ﬁnancing infrastructure needs in developing economies. If the 
BRICS countries are to advance progressive values by ensuring 
that civil society plays a key role in shaping this institution, 
then it will require strong civil society advocacy in BRICS 
countries to seek the inclusion of human rights and social 
accountability principles in every aspect of the bank’s design. 
It should also be a key demand that the bank’s funds are not 
used to support oppressive governments.7
One emerging challenge demonstrated by the BRICS countries 
is the signiﬁcant lag between a country’s rise to global political 
prominence and the evolution of civil society structures and 
focuses, backed by a supportive legal and policy framework. 
For example, our contribution from Brazilian CSO network 
Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais 
(ABONG) points out that the legal framework recognises 
Brazil as an Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA) recipient 
but not as a provider of cooperation resources to developing 
countries. Civil society coalitions that attempt inﬂuence 
over foreign policy in such countries tend to be nascent and 
untested, and need to be better encouraged and supported.
Lessons from the post-Busan process
Our previous State of Civil Society report highlighted that 
one of the breakthroughs achieved at the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea in 
November/December 2011,8 was the acknowledgement of 
the link between the standards set out in international human 
rights agreements and the conditions that enable CSOs to 
maximise their contribution to development. Another was 
the acknowledgement of the CSO-authored International 
Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness as the basis 
for CSOs to be held accountable as effective development 
actors.9 This is an important benchmark in establishing the 
vital role of civil society, and its autonomy, with Busan also 
having reafﬁrmed the principle that CSOs are independent 
development actors in their own right.
The Busan agreement implies that a strong and vibrant civil 
society is in itself a development end, not only as a tool for 
helping to advance the development efforts of others. The 
difference between taking an instrumental and intrinsic 
value of civil society, in this case speciﬁcally looking at donor 
viewpoints, is established by our contributors Jacqueline 
Wood and Karin Fällman:
“At the instrumental end of the spectrum are those who 
believe CSOs are best placed to implement projects and 
programmes on behalf of donors and governments, ﬁlling 
gaps until such time as developing country governments are 
in a position to close them. On the other end of the spectrum 
are those who see civil society, and donor relationships with 
CSOs, as complementary and just as necessary as donor 
relationships with governments and the private sector to 
the social, economic, and democratic development of any 
country.”
In the lead up to the Busan forum, CSOs argued that there was 
a need to detach the principle that development policies and 
practices should be nationally owned – country ownership 
– from the frequent conﬂation that this means they should 
be government-owned. As noted in our contribution from 
the Reality of Aid Africa, the notion of democratic ownership 
of development opens up new scope for CSOs in the 
development sphere to demand to be involved in development 
processes, including when they do not necessarily align with 
government-led development priorities.
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The year in review
An overview of key events since the State of Civil Society was published in April 2012
2012
Date Country Event
1 April Myanmar Voters go to the polls in elections in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi‘s National League for 
Democracy wins 43 out of 45 seats.
16 April International Jim Yong Kim, co-founder and executive director of CSO Partners in Health, is 
elected President of the World Bank.
28 April Malaysia Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrate in Kuala Lumpur to call for free and 
fair elections as the 13th General Elections get underway. Police brutally suppress 
protestors, with over 500 individuals arrested and journalists assaulted.
8 May Thailand Ampon Tangnoppakul, a Thai man in his 60s who was sentenced to 20 years in jail 
for sending a text message deemed offensive to the royal family, dies.
24 May Egypt Voters in Egypt go to the polls for the presidential election, 18 months after Hosni 
Mubarak was ousted. A month later, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
declared the winner.
24 May Hungary The Hungarian Parliament passes legislative amendments to curb media freedoms.
19 June United Kingdom Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, takes refuge in the Ecuadorean Embassy in 
London to avoid extradition to Sweden to face charges of sexual assault.
20–22 June Brazil The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro 
(Rio+20) marks the 20th anniversary of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED). CSOs criticise the conference’s outcomes as placing 
private proﬁt before people and the environment.
26 June Mexico A new law for the protection of human rights defenders and journalists takes effect 
in Mexico.
9 July International Russia and China veto a UN Security Council resolution that threatens Syria with 
sanctions over the use of deadly force against civilians in the on-going conﬂict. 
Eleven Security Council members vote in favour while Pakistan and South Africa 
abstain.
13 July Russia Russia passes a Bill obliging NGOs that receive funding from abroad to register as 
foreign agents or risk heavy ﬁnes and jail time.
30 July Syria The UN estimates that over 200,000 people have ﬂed intense ﬁghting in Aleppo in 
the previous two days.
30 July Sudan Twelve protestors, mostly students, are killed and over a hundred injured as police 
use live ammunition on protestors.
16 August South Africa In the Marikana Massacre, 34 miners are killed and another 78 injured when police 
ofﬁcers ﬁre at striking workers at the Lonmin Platinum Mine near Rustenburg, 
South Africa.
17 August Russia  Three members of Pussy Riot are convicted of hooliganism motivated by religious 
hatred and sentenced to two years in prison.
30 August Tibet China announces a US$4.7 billion controversial theme park in Tibet.
11 September Libya The US Ambassador to Libya is one of four people killed in an attack on the 
US Embassy in Benghazi.
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Date Country Event
13 September India 10,000 protestors in Tamil Nadu state demand the closure of a nuclear plant. Police 
use live ammunition against villagers. One person is killed, dozens hospitalised and 
50 people arrested.
9 October Pakistan Pakistan human rights child activist Malala Yousafzai is shot in the head and neck 
by the Tehreek-e-Taliban while she sits with classmates on a school bus.
19 October Ethiopia The Supreme Court upholds the freezing of assets of Ethiopia’s last two remaining 
human rights groups.
24- 29 October The Americas Hurricane Sandy wreaks havoc in nine countries in the Caribbean and North 
America, killing at least 285 people and resulting in nearly US$75 billion in damage.
7 November Greece Greek police ﬁre teargas and water cannons to disperse approximately 100,000 
protestors who protest in the main square in opposition to a new austerity package.
16 November India The rape of an Indian woman on a bus in New Delhi sparks nationwide protests 
and global concern about India’s treatment of women.
26 November Belarus Leading Belarusian human rights group Viasna is evicted from its ofﬁce as its 
premises are sealed by government ofﬁcials.
1 December Colombia After receiving multiple threats from paramilitary group Black Eagles, Miller Angula 
Rivera of the Association of Displaced Afro Colombians (AFRODES) is killed in 
Colombia.
4–15 December The Philippines The most powerful typhoon to ever hit the Philippines kills more than 1,000 people 
and causes over US$1 billion in damage.
8 December Qatar The UN climate conference agrees to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.
25 December Nigeria In Christmas church bombings in Nigeria, attacks on two churches kill 12 people.
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10 January France The co-founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and two other Kurdish activists are 
found dead in Paris.
24 January Vietnam Human rights blogger Le Anh Hung is kidnapped from his workplace by security 
agents and temporarily interned in a mental health facility.
28 January Iran Iran arrests 14 journalists for alleged cooperation with foreign-based language 
media organisations.
5 February Bangladesh Hundreds of thousands of people upset with the verdict of the Bangladesh war 
crimes tribunal protest. Around 60 people have died in the so-called Shahbag 
protests, which are ongoing at the time of going to press.
20 February Bulgaria Following nationwide protests against electricity prices and austerity measures, the 
Bulgarian prime minister announces that his cabinet will resign.
21 March International The UN Human Rights Council passes landmark resolution to protect human rights 
defenders.
24 March Central African 
Republic
Rebel leader of the Séléka movement, Michel Djotodia, storms the Presidential 
Palace and declares himself president.
1 April Sudan The President of Sudan orders the release of all political prisoners.
14 April Venezuela Following Hugo Chavez’s death on 1 April, Venezuela elects his successor 
Nicolás Maduro as President by a narrow margin.
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Our contribution from AidWatch Canada makes clear the 
connection between democratic ownership of development 
and the enabling environment for civil society:
“Strengthening democratic ownership for development and 
an improved CSO enabling environment go hand-in-hand. The 
institutionalisation of democratic policy processes involving a 
diversity of CSOs with respect to the planning, implementation 
and assessment of development priorities at the country level 
will also lead to strengthened enabling conditions for CSOs.”
Sustained engagement by civil society is now needed 
to monitor governments’ follow-through on their Busan 
commitments and to expose government actions that 
are not consistent with these commitments. This includes 
actions that might limit or undermine the environment for 
civil society. Nevertheless, major opportunities for global 
level dialogue on the enabling environment have ﬂowed from 
Busan. The ministerial-level Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation established following Busan 
includes the CPDE as a full partner.11 There is also a multi-
stakeholder Task Team on Development Effectiveness and 
Enabling Environment that brings together representatives of 
donors, governments and CSOs, one of the roles of which is 
to give greater political proﬁle to norms and good practices 
on the enabling environment.
As argued in our contribution from AidWatch Canada, the 
Busan process should represent a new minimum standard 
for the inclusion of CSOs. It should remain a civil society 
demand that future multilateral processes, including those 
to elaborate and apply development goals, should be as 
inclusive as Busan. In March 2013, CSOs, as well as the multi-
stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness 
and Enabling Environment, proposed just this to the High 
Level Panel on Post-2015 Development Goals.
These relatively positive examples of collaborations around the 
development effectiveness agenda point to what may seem a 
self-evident truth, but one we feel frequently needs restating: 
one way to improve the environment for civil society is to 
begin and work through collaborations and partnerships with 
state agencies and other actors that affect the conditions for 
civil society. While partnerships have an instrumental value, in 
helping to achieve progress towards speciﬁc goals, they also 
have an intrinsic value: they help to build capital and trust, 
and demonstrate that there is value-added to democracy and 
good governance from civil society inclusion. By implication, 
this also suggests that one way to improve the environment 
for civil society, and promote dialogue about its improvement, 
is to look for areas where collaboration seems most possible, 
and to build up from these collaborations.
The Enabling Environment Index as a 
monitoring tool
Although the 2013 State of Civil Society report presents 
a wealth of evidence, case studies and fresh insights, we 
recognise also the pressing need for reliable, comparative, 
quantitative information to ﬁll the gap of systematic 
research and reporting on the enabling environment.
CIVICUS is working with the University of Pretoria, South 
Africa to develop the Civil Society Enabling Environment 
Index (EE Index). The EE index will be a regular global 
assessment of key external dimensions affecting civil 
society, which measures and analyses changing trends 
in inﬂuences on the enabling environment in different 
countries. In line with our broad view of the conditions 
that affect civil society, the EE Index will examine not 
only the legal and regulatory frameworks that govern 
CSOs in each country, but also other political or societal 
conditions that may be enabling or disenabling.
This will be accompanied by work to help assess the 
enabling environment at the national level, in partnership 
with the International Center for Not-for-Proﬁt Law 
(ICNL). Between 2012 and 2015, we are conducting 
national assessments in selected countries, with the 
intention of building a collective knowledge base on the 
environment for civil society, in different contexts.
It is important and encouraging that the enabling 
environment for CSOs is one of the indicators for 
measuring progress on Busan commitments. The EE Index 
is one initiative we are undertaking as a member of the 
CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) that 
will contribute to the development of an indicator on the 
enabling environment.
We recognise that members of the civil society Open 
Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness and BetterAid 
coalitions, now succeeded by the CPDE, have advocated 
for the enabling environment to be seen primarily in terms 
of the legal and policy conditions that enable or disenable 
CSOs to act effectively as development actors.10 Our EE 
Index will be broader in remit as it seeks to measure a set of 
conditions that impact on the capacity of citizens, whether 
individually or in an organised fashion, to participate 
and engage in the civil society arena in a sustained and 
voluntary manner.
We invite interested stakeholders to join us in a consultative 
process to debate our conceptual and methodological 
framework for the index and determine the extent to 
which we weight the different dimensions of the index. 
Further information is available on our website.
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In this regard, our contribution from AidWatch Canada points 
out:
“Improvements in CSO enabling conditions at the country level 
will require changes to how CSOs are perceived as development 
actors by governments and donors. Sometimes, these changes 
can happen as a consequence of CSO collaboration on issues 
more in harmony with the particular interests of developing 
country governments. For example, in the ﬁnal preparations 
for Busan, several African CSO activists worked closely with 
government ofﬁcials through the Africa Union (AU), which 
resulted in a common African agenda for Busan. In this 
engagement with government ofﬁcials and ministers, CSOs 
were able not only to inﬂuence the African agenda, but also 
give a practical demonstration of the value-added of civil 
society expertise.”
One caveat that should be made when considering the 
value of Busan is that it doesn’t necessarily relate to the 
full spectrum of civil society and civil society’s concerns. 
Civil society isn’t just about development, or engagement 
with multilateral agencies and processes, and civil society is 
more than CSOs. A focus on government and donor policies 
and actions should not cause us to overlook that there is 
considerable civil society that did not necessarily see the need 
to engage in the Busan processes, and that indeed not only 
does not rely on donor funding, but exists and thrives outside 
donor frameworks. Nevertheless, the value of Busan remains, 
beyond its immediate sphere, as an example of successful 
civil society inclusion, and of civil society collaboration and 
sustained action to maximise inﬂuence.
A ray of hope from the European Union
A further fresh opportunity arose for civil society in 2012 
in the form of a statement of recognition by the European 
Commission of the value of civil society, as set out in its 
2012 Communication on relations with CSOs – The roots of 
democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement 
with civil society in external relations – which states that:
“The international community, the EU included, has a duty to 
advocate for a space to operate for both CSOs and individuals. 
The EU should lead by example, creating peer pressure through 
diplomacy and political dialogue with governments and by 
publicly raising human rights concerns… In its cooperation 
with partner governments, the EU will seek to scale up public 
authorities’ capacity to work constructively with civil society.”12
For the ﬁrst time, this codiﬁes opportunities for CSOs to engage 
at different levels: with the European Union (EU), to make sure 
that its actions follow its rhetoric and mean the EU becomes 
an active agent for the development of new, progressive civil 
society norms; with governments in EU member countries to 
hold them to these standards; and with the governments of 
countries in which the EU and its agencies are involved to 
seek to improve the conditions for civil society as part of EU 
interventions. It sets standards that can be used to monitor 
whether improvements to conditions for civil society result 
from EU activities. It also suggests potential for civil society 
collaboration between internationally-oriented CSOs in EU 
member countries and CSOs in developing countries in which 
the EU is active.
This acknowledgement of the value of civil society 
notwithstanding, the current actions of several EU member 
governments towards civil society remain challenging, as 
expressed through some rather ambivalent attitudes toward 
civil society in their countries, and towards developing 
country civil society in their ODA decisions, as we discuss 
further below. As CONCORD Europe, a network of European 
civil society platforms puts it:
“Even though EU governments have an enabling regulatory 
framework for civil society actions, budgetary decisions in 
several member states in the past few years have been strongly 
disadvantageous for supporting civil society actions.”
The outlook
The contemporary outlook could therefore appear gloomy 
for civil society, but in the midst of this, openings to seek 
change continue to arise. Some new strategies are being 
formed and applied to ﬁght back and help civil society to play 
its proper roles. Contributions to this report offer a number 
of experiences and tools for potential replication. Many of 
these underline the essential value of building civil society 
connections and coalitions, and of international solidarity.
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2. What do we mean when we talk about the enabling environment?
The enabling environment for civil society is not always an 
easy concept to grasp. There is not necessarily agreement 
among civil society and the people and institutions with a 
stake in civil society on what a strong civil society enabling 
environment should look like. It is, in other words, an evolving 
concept. CIVICUS, not least through our ongoing work to 
deﬁne and deploy the EE Index, and our work with ICNL 
to assess the enabling environment at the country level, 
is seeking to improve understanding of, support for and 
intelligence on the enabling environment.
Thinking beyond the national level
We need to understand where to look, as well as what to 
look at. The enabling environment is something we mostly 
tend to think about at the national level. For example, when 
we examine laws, regulations and policies that affect whether 
CSOs are free to realise their potential, we normally look at 
national level laws, regulations and policies. It is important, 
however, not to fall into the trap of stopping our scrutiny and 
analysis at national borders.
In contexts where there is repression, we need to hold on to 
the fact that the minimal package of civil society rights that 
we in the CIVICUS alliance seek to defend and promote as 
the foundation of the enabling environment – the freedom 
of opinion and expression, freedom to associate and 
freedom to assemble – are globally deﬁned, and enshrined 
in the International Bill of Human Rights and international 
human rights standards. When we are seeking to improve the 
conditions for civil society in difﬁcult national contexts, it is 
essential to make reference to globally endorsed rights, and to 
use multilateral as well as national levers.
For example, our contribution from Russian CSO Citizens’ 
Watch sees clear value in working internationally to exert 
pressure to improve national level standards, and particularly 
in a key multilateral arena for civil society, the UN Human 
Rights Council:
“It cannot be emphasised too much; the outcome of this 
struggle depends, to a great extent, on solidarity with the 
international human rights community that Russian NGOs are 
able to rally.”
Regional intergovernmental bodies, such as the Council of 
Europe in Russia’s case, and bodies such as the African Union 
and European Union in other contributions made to our 
report, also offer important levers. They can take the focus 
away from contentious national level debate, and help deﬁne 
supportive norms at a higher level by sharing more positive 
experiences from neighbouring countries.
The use of international spaces also helps demonstrate the 
value of international civil society connections, particularly 
those collaborations that bring exchanges of solidarity and 
practical support between national CSOs and international 
CSOs familiar with the workings of multilateral processes.
At the same time, multilateral engagement can provoke 
domestic risks: our contributor Front Line Defenders reports 
that in March 2012 Sri Lankan activists faced threats from 
high level government ofﬁcials after taking part in a Human 
Rights Council session. Bahraini civil society activists were 
similarly targeted for their participation in a Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) session of the Human Rights Council 
on Bahrain in May 2012.13 Meanwhile as our contributor 
from Venezuelan organisation Civilis reports, the Venezuelan 
government’s response to criticism from the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission, which held a progressive regional 
level hearing on Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Association 
in Latin America in March 2012, was to withdraw from this 
body.
A multilateral enabling environment?
A second concern beyond the national level is the extent to 
which the environment is enabling for civil society within 
multilateral processes, both formal and informal. We believe 
it is still important to push for civil society inclusion in 
international processes, with a notable ﬁrst in 2012 being 
the consultative status granted to some CSOs - humanitarian 
NGOs - in the Organisation of Islamic Conference meeting 
held in Djibouti. However there is also a strong civil society 
critique, particularly following Rio+20, of the ceremonial 
inclusion of civil society. Nothing has changed since Rio+20 
to challenge our verdict that multilateral overhaul is needed.
Our contribution from INTRAC puts forward essential 
questions on UN reform:
“…the UN system needs to review its roles, focus and priorities. 
Key questions here include: are the large numbers of development 
groups or specialised agencies as necessary as they once were? 
With both bilateral and CSO donors leaving many countries, 
should the UN be considering its own roles in these countries 
more acutely? Perhaps re-focussing UN priorities and action 
around governance at the international level and working in 
areas of comparative advantages for multilateral organisations 
(e.g. inﬂuence on governments, certain forms of technical 
expertise, working in the poorest areas) makes more sense for UN 
development agencies…”
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Key principles
The 2011 International Framework for CSO Development 
Effectiveness, the outcomes of broad civil society 
consultations by the Open Forum for CSO Development 
Effectiveness, sets out ﬁve essential areas for minimum 
standards that together form a deﬁnition of an enabling 
environment for CSOs: respect for human rights obligations; 
CSOs as actors in their own right: democratic political and 
policy dialogue; accountability and transparency; and 
enabling ﬁnancing.
From our consultations for this report a number of potential 
dimensions emerged, elaborating and expanding on this 
framework, which can inﬂuence the environment for civil 
society. This is not an exhaustive list, but on the basis of 
contributions to our report, we suggest that these are key 
priorities or areas of apparent opportunity. These include 
two major areas where it seems that CSOs themselves can 
take some straightforward steps to help facilitate a more 
enabling environment:
• Internal steps that can be taken to improve CSOs’ 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability. An 
enabling environment is one where civil society groups 
have taken – and are recognised and expected to have 
taken - every effort to be transparent and accountable to 
their stakeholders, and their legitimacy is considered to 
be derived from their endorsement by their stakeholders, 
particularly those in whose interests they claim to act.
• Connections between CSOs. An enabling environment 
is one where there are multiple connections and 
collaborations between different civil society groups 
and individuals, including different types of groups, 
and there are collaborative platforms and coalitions 
at different levels, including thematic levels and local, 
national and international levels, such that civil society 
groups can share intelligence, pool resources and 
maximise their strengths and opportunities.
There are a number of areas where CSOs should seek for key 
principles and standards to be reached and upheld:
• The legal and regulatory environment. An enabling 
environment is one where the state’s laws, regulations and 
policies on civil society (at both national and sub-national 
level) make it easy for civil society groups to form, operate 
free from unwarranted interference, express their views, 
communicate, convene, cooperate and seek resources. 
An enabling environment is also one that promotes the 
rights of individuals to freedom of expression, assembly 
and association and protects citizens from harm that may 
result from the exercise of those rights.
• The political and governmental environment. An 
enabling environment is one where the institutions and 
agencies of government, including government bodies, 
political parties and politicians, recognise civil society 
as a legitimate social actor, and provide systematic 
opportunities for state and civil society institutions 
to work together. An enabling environment is also 
one where there are well-established mechanisms for 
managing conﬂict and post-conﬂict transition, and 
where civil society personnel are able to go about their 
work and lives without fear of attack, with full recourse 
to the criminal justice system in the event of attack.
• Public attitudes, trust, tolerance and participation. 
An enabling environment is one where the public 
recognise civil society as a legitimate social actor; there 
is extensive trust in civil society bodies, and in other 
public actors; there is general tolerance of people and 
groups who have different viewpoints and identities; and 
where it is easy for people to participate in civil society 
and there is widespread voluntary participation across a 
range of civil society platforms and spaces.
• Corruption. An enabling environment is one where 
there is zero tolerance of corruption by state ofﬁcials, 
political actors, people in business and civil society 
personnel, and where civil society is free to call attention 
to corruption issues and this is accepted as a legitimate 
civil society role.
• Communications and technology. An enabling 
environment is one where civil society groups and 
individuals have reliable, cheap and widespread access to 
communications platforms and technologies; and where 
civil society personnel have numerous opportunities to 
put their views across in the public domain alongside 
those of people from government, politics and the 
business sphere, and a diversity of voices are represented 
in different media.
• Resources. An enabling environment is one where civil 
society groups are able to access resources from a range 
of sustainable sources, including domestically, and 
to deﬁne their own activities, rather than have these 
deﬁned by funding opportunities.
Naturally, as we will see, these areas are not really so neatly 
distinct; they are highly interdependent, and relate to and 
inﬂuence each other.
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The ETC Group’s contribution also critiques CSOs’ apparent 
complicity in the weak role they are allowed in processes such 
as Rio+20, pointing out that:
“As we look for the elements of an enabling environment for 
civil society, we need to look at both civil society’s strengths 
and its limitations. An enabling environment doesn’t just mean 
changing the rules, it means remembering civil society roles.”
In this critique, civil society needs to play to its strengths, such 
as its knowledge, the growing connections within civil society, 
its staying power, and its access to public trust. However, civil 
society also needs to acknowledge key weaknesses, such as 
a deﬁciency in adequate engagement with decision-makers, 
a lack of detailed participation in processes, and excessive 
caution. To date, the analysis suggests, there have been gaps 
in strategy, lack of engagement by developed country CSOs 
with developing country governments, and little willingness 
to challenge or break rules, as well as an absence of joined-up 
communications strategy.
A further concern with the multilateral sphere is that the 
nuanced understanding many of us now have about the scope 
and diversity of civil society, given our heightened awareness 
of the social movements that came to prominence in recent 
years, is for the most part not reﬂected in the patterns of 
civil society inclusion in large, global processes. As civil 
society, our understanding of what civil society is and does 
has evolved faster than that of multilateral bodies. We need 
to ask: to what extent are the CSOs accredited to multilateral 
meetings, such as those of international ﬁnancial institutions, 
representative of the breadth and depth of civil society? Are 
these essentially the same organisations that shuttle from 
one international meeting to another? And whose interests 
can they claim to represent? As our contributor from the ETC 
Group puts it:
“A clear distinction needs to be made between not-for-proﬁt 
civil society organisations or NGOs and social movements. 
It is no longer acceptable for NGOs to speak for marginalised 
peoples.”
The response to dissatisfaction with the multilateral world as 
it currently stands should including calling for improvement in 
the environment for civil society participation in multilateral 
processes, but it should also entail critically assessing the way 
in which we as civil society operate, and being ﬂexible enough 
to adopt new techniques and bring in a broader range of civil 
society voices. An example of good practice offered is that of 
the Committee on Food Security, as in this ofﬁcial UN body 
there is high status given to civil society, credible civil society 
voice, and conscious reaching out to leadership from social 
movements, such as Via Campesina, beyond CSOs.
This positive experience of civil society inclusion, and that of 
the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation, 
when compared with largely disappointing experiences in 
other forums, suggests that civil society must identify and 
work with supportive governments to push for meaningful 
inclusion of representative and diverse CSOs in UN structures 
and processes. In particular we should push for this in the 
authorship, implementation and monitoring of post-2015 
development goals.
The dilemma that arises in considering the multilateral 
environment for civil society is that of the hierarchy of needs 
and opportunities: where best should CSOs place their limited 
resources? Should these be concentrated at the multilateral 
level in the hope of inﬂuencing international frameworks, 
which can in turn be used to set new norms, around which 
advocacy can be organised to improve conditions at the 
national level? Or given that the enabling environment 
concept is one that is not yet won, does it make sense to seek 
improvement at the national level and then try to inﬂuence 
governments to translate these to the multilateral arena?
On the balance of the contributions to our report, it seems 
clear that there is still much to be done at the national level, 
and this remains the critical arena for winning the argument 
on the enabling environment and seeking change. But there 
is still value in being able to make comparisons and share 
knowledge between civil society in different countries, and a 
need for international networking and solidarity to support 
national efforts. CSOs must also seek not to duplicate each 
other’s efforts or compete in the international arena. There is a 
need for different strata of civil society to operate at the most 
level most appropriate to them, but also for cooperation that 
builds equitable connections between colleagues working at 
different levels.14
Thinking below the national level
An underexplored idea that we suggest needs future 
investigation is that of the sub-national environment for civil 
society, where local levels of governance can have an impact 
on the conditions for civil society distinct from the decisions 
made by national governments. This is particularly the case in 
large countries, such as India and Pakistan, where state and 
provincial governments have wide powers, countries where 
there is a high level of devolved power, such as Switzerland 
and the UK, and countries where traditional local authority 
remains important, as in many Paciﬁc islands.
For example, our contribution from Voluntary Action Network 
India (VANI) tells us that a potentially helpful national 
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policy on the voluntary sector, addressing issues such as the 
autonomy of CSOs, their ability to raise funds and partnerships 
with the government, was introduced in 2007, but has been 
stymied because it has not passed into legislation at the state 
level. Our contribution from the NGO Federation of Nepal 
points to unnecessary conditions being imposed on CSOs by 
local administrations.
It is clear that in our work on the environment for civil society, 
we need to continue to take account of the reality that local 
level governance structures and spaces are important to many, 
given that many of the decisions that inﬂuence people’s daily 
lives are made at the sub-national level. Indeed, we could go 
so far as to argue that people do not live in countries as much 
as they live in cities, villages and states within a country.
A need to localise our analysis goes hand in hand with our 
understanding in civil society of the value of bottom-up 
processes that ﬂow from the local level. As the contribution 
from GNDR’s Terry Gibson points out:
“Many policies intended to drive progress in disaster risk 
reduction are primarily created and then implemented in a top 
down way. They are led from an (often external) institutional 
and governmental level, depending on plans, leadership, 
knowledge and expertise far removed from the local scene. 
The result is a gap between high-level policy and practical 
implementation... good local governance depends on good 
local knowledge and the key ingredient for local governance 
based on local knowledge is an active citizenry.”
This dissonance is not only applicable in the context of 
disaster reduction, but to civil society more broadly: in any 
sphere of work, strengthening resilience and capacity at the 
local level requires strong local organisations and partnerships 
– and a focus on enhancing the local level environment for 
civil society.
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3. Key aspects of the enabling environment and recent trends
We ﬁrst call attention to two key aspects where we in civil 
society can ourselves lead on steps to make an enabling 
environment more likely, and in doing so enhance our abilities 
to make demands of the government, politicians and others 
who inﬂuence the environment for civil society by speaking 
from a position of increased strength.
a. Legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability
Many CSOs have long acknowledged they should demonstrate 
that they are modelling good practice – in effect to mirror 
internally the enabling environment they would seek for 
their work externally.15 We could go further and say that 
transparency, honesty, humility, and indeed an ability to 
admit and report on failure, should be key civil society values, 
and a point of distinction between civil society and other 
realms, such as those of government and business. As such 
civil society should be in the vanguard of demonstrating best 
practice in legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and 
be conﬁdent enough to admit failure when it occurs.
Actions by CSOs to prove they are transparent and 
accountable, and that they enjoy legitimacy and credibility 
among their key constituents, are not just an important end 
in themselves, but also give CSOs a stronger platform to 
demonstrate they have made the changes they seek in others, 
and to rebut criticisms and verbal attacks that make it harder 
for CSOs to do their work.
Steps to demonstrate the legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency of CSOs, and prove their effectiveness, continue 
to be important. Our contribution from the past Executive 
Director of the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia 
reports that in Cambodia there is CSO enthusiasm for a self-
certiﬁcation initiative, while in India, VANI highlights that 
there have been recent improvements in self-reporting from 
CSOs, in part to head off regulatory threats, accompanied by 
increased networking among CSOs:
“…internally, voluntary organisations have invested time and 
meagre resources to improve their management systems. 
VANI produced a document on draft internal policies that 
was well received by the voluntary sector… Organisations 
are coming together to face the challenges and redeﬁning 
their relationships with government, private sector and other 
stakeholders.”
In Brazil, ABONG acknowledges that the existence and 
subsequent exposure of fake CSOs, including bogus 
organisations formed as front organisations for corrupt 
government ofﬁcials, harms civil society itself. In the 2013 
edition of the Edelman Trust Barometer, trust in Brazil in 
NGOs, to use its term, declined by a drastic 31 points, which 
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was attributed to a series of crises and scandals that plagued 
CSOs.16 CSOs therefore have a self-interest in developing a 
regulatory environment that makes clear their legitimacy and 
credibility.
It is encouraging in this regard that the recommendations 
of the 2012 CIVICUS World Assembly, held in Montreal, 
Canada in September 2012, speak about what steps civil 
society actors themselves feel they should take to improve 
the arrangements of governance, rather than simply make 
demands of governments and donors. Recommendations 
include those of building new connections and partnerships, 
seeking alternative funding models, integrating issues of 
sustainability in CSO approaches, and working within a 
human rights framework.17
While self-regulation initiatives and mechanisms have so far 
primarily been deployed at the national level, the continued 
growth of global initiatives such as the INGO Accountability 
Charter, to which international CSO members including 
CIVICUS submit annual accountability reports, suggests that 
there is an increasing need to look at accountability issues 
beyond national borders.18 There is real value in sharing 
experiences and promoting good practice across countries on 
which types of legitimacy, transparency and accountability 
initiatives work best in different contexts.
b. Connections, coalitions and solidarity
A second area where CSOs can take steps to enhance 
their strength and increase the potential for improving 
their environment is in making civil society connections. 
In examining the environment for civil society we need to 
consider the extent, level and quality of connections, and 
state of relations, between CSOs: not only between individual 
CSOs, but also between CSOs of different types (for example, 
between development-oriented CSOs and trade unions, or 
between human rights CSOs and faith groups).
At CIVICUS, we naturally take a deep interest in civil society 
connections, and are concerned with the relatively weak 
connections we have seen between different parts of civil 
society, such as the gap between established CSOs and new 
social movements.19 We believe the argument is being won, 
and it is becoming clearer that civil society is generally more 
effective, and we can win more recognition for our efforts, 
when we work together and make stronger connections 
between like-minded organisations and individuals. This 
enable-s us collectively to develop stronger capacities to 
engage governments and other holders of power. For example, 
our contributions from Platformas das ONGs de Cabo Verde 
and Guinea’s Forum des ONG pour le Développement 
Durable argue that better networks and connections within 
civil society are a necessary precondition for enhancing civil 
society’s relationship with the state. Our contribution from 
INTRAC points to some of the new collaborative movements 
their Civil Society at a Crossroads international research 
programme has observed:
“…movements arising from students’ protests (Chile), 
abortion campaigning (Uruguay), campaigns for lesbian and 
gay partnerships (Argentina), and commuter movements 
(Indonesia). These movements illustrate the importance 
of social groups making broad alliances in favour of generic 
issues signiﬁcant to society.”
Part of the value of a focus on civil society connections is 
that it helps us to take an assets-based approach - identifying 
what currently exists of value and working to strengthen and 
expand these assets - rather than focussing only on deﬁcits. In 
doing so, it can help us add nuance to what could otherwise 
be a rather disempowering narrative: that the conditions for 
civil society are determined solely by external forces (such 
as governments, donors and multilateral agencies), and 
that these are far from ideal. While in many contexts the 
conditions for civil society are of course seriously affected by 
external forces, it is important for us to remember that there 
are steps we can take to improve the conditions for our work.
The formation of CSO coalitions can also be signiﬁcant in 
contexts of crisis or conﬂict. The formation of a new civil 
society coalition in Somalia – the Somali Civil Society Alliance 
- across three previously warring regions is seen as a step 
forward in civil society’s role in promoting peace-building by 
our contributor, the SISA Centre for Corporate Partnership, 
which is also the Head of Secretariat for the Africa CSO 
Platform on Principled Partnership (ACP). In South Sudan, 
the NGO Forum has formed to coordinate humanitarian 
and development efforts in order to address the needs of the 
citizens of this newly independent state.
The challenge always for civil society is that of how to 
maintain this kind of coalition approach when a moment of 
crisis or opportunity is past. Our contribution from US civil 
society platform InterAction afﬁrms the value of a long-
term coalition-building strategy for developing stronger 
negotiating positions with government over key points of 
development policy. The post-Busan process, where the CPDE 
formed in December 2012 as a coalition to sustain civil 
society engagement on development effectiveness, bringing 
together the two networks that had led work ahead of Busan 
– BetterAid and the Open Forum for CSO Development 
Effectiveness – is one area where much energy and time has 
clearly gone into sustaining a coalition beyond events.
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For example, ICNL’s contribution reports that in 2012 Malaysia’s 
law banning street protests came into effect; penalties against 
protests were steeply increased in Azerbaijan;21 and restrictions 
on demonstrations involving more than 50 people were 
introduced in Quebec, Canada, following widespread student 
protests. Meanwhile, in Bahrain the Ministry of the Interior 
criminalised marches and gatherings in 2012, while in Russia, 
a controversial law was enacted which increased existing 
penalties for violating rules on public protests by a staggering 
150 times for individuals and 300 times for organisations. ICNL 
argues that the situation here is growing worse.
The full realisation of the right to peaceful assembly is an 
essential condition for enabling civil society. This is therefore an 
area where CSOs and networks, including CIVICUS, need to stay 
informed, active and coordinated to intervene when attempts 
to reduce the legal and policy space for dissent are made.
Barriers to CSO formation and operation
A number of governments have recently either introduced 
laws or announced that they intend to do so to regulate the 
formation and operation of CSOs. Such laws would make 
the registration requirements for CSOs more strict, through 
practices such as:
• prohibiting unregistered organisations from conducting 
activities (Cuba, Uzbekistan, Zambia);
• stipulating the category and number of eligible founders 
(Malaysia, Qatar, Thailand, Turkmenistan);
Collaborative strategies in advocacy success in Cambodia
Our contribution from Cambodia demonstrates the value 
of collaboration. Several attempts were made by the 
government to introduce a new law to regulate NGOs and 
other types of CSOs, which many in civil society fear would 
be harmful. Moves to introduce the law were put on hold 
in December 2011 for a period of two years, following a 
tenacious and voluble civil society campaign.
The Cambodian contribution suggests that international 
solidarity and internal coalition-building were central 
to their success in winning the time to work further with 
government, with the aim of challenging and changing 
disabling provisions in the draft bill. The proposed law was 
seen as an existential threat and therefore forced together 
different types of CSOs that would not normally combine. 
Meanwhile, national-international CSO connections helped 
to achieve publicity and awareness.
The Cambodian approach also combined advocacy at 
different levels - national, regional and global – suggesting 
we need to look for opportunities and points of leverage 
beyond the national level. The fact that Cambodia’s 
government is currently chairing the Association of 
South East Asian Nations, a regional intergovernmental 
organisation, and would presumably want to use this as an 
opportunity to burnish its international image, offered one 
lever. With donors, the advocacy message was that strong 
development progress and donor investments that had 
been made in Cambodia’s signiﬁcant recovery from past 
conﬂict were at risk. Seeking government engagement 
with and support for the Istanbul Principles for CSO 
Development Effectiveness20 was another way of brokering 
dialogue, playing to Cambodia’s desire to present itself in 
the right way on the world stage.
c. The policy and legal sphere
While CSOs can work in these ﬁrst two key areas to improve 
the potential for a more enabling environment, and to 
enhance their own strength and negotiating power, it is 
nevertheless the case that forces outside the civil society 
arena affect the conditions for civil society. Even if civil 
society is the best it can be, external actors can interact 
with and hinder the steps CSOs take in these areas. For 
example, CSOs can ﬁnd that their own attempts to advance 
transparency and accountability are not reciprocated by the 
state. Indeed, higher levels of corruption and poor governance 
in broader society make it harder to be transparent and 
work in accountable ways. Similarly, attempts at civil society 
collaboration may be stymied by laws and regulations that 
create barriers against them.
At CIVICUS, we have long had a special interest in the 
legislation and government policies that affect the ability of 
CSOs to form, function and ﬂourish. Many of the contributions 
to our report make clear that the legislative and policy sphere 
is still an important area of contestation. It is one in which, 
across a range of countries, various attempts are being made 
to reduce and restrict the space for civil society.
Barriers to assembly
Many recent restrictions are barriers imposed against the right 
to peaceful assembly – a move that seems clearly to come 
as a reaction to the surge of people-power protests in 2012. 
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• expensive, complex registration processes (Eritrea, Vietnam);
• vague grounds for denial of registration (Bahrain, Malaysia, 
Russia);
• burdensome re-registration requirements (Uzbekistan, 
Zambia);
• barriers for international organisations (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda).22
As these examples indicate, registration requirements may be 
lengthy, onerous or expensive, and therefore particularly difﬁcult 
for smaller CSOs. Further, laws in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
for example, give the state the power to declare a CSO unlawful 
or withdraw its registration. In early 2013, the government 
of Indonesia introduced a Bill on Mass Organisations, which 
would prohibit some CSOs and give the government power to 
suspend or dissolve CSOs.23 ICNL reports that there seems to 
be a particular problem with the introduction of regressive laws 
in Asia, especially South East Asia, at present.
Even in Norway, where relationships between civil society 
and government are favourably assessed by our contributor, 
Norwegian CSO network Frivillighet Norge, bureaucracy is 
still identiﬁed as a challenge:
“The most worrying trend is towards more bureaucracy, 
where organisations are required to provide more and more 
detailed reports to multiple public ofﬁces. The situation is most 
worrying on the local level, where the organisations are entirely 
dependent upon voluntary work. Although it is a priority from 
the government to reduce bureaucracy, this has not resulted in 
any real improvements.”
Some governments use registration requirements as a way 
of placing limitations on activities that CSOs are lawfully 
permitted to do. The prohibition of ‘political activity’ in India, 
generally left ill-deﬁned, invites closer state intervention 
into and scrutiny of CSOs’ activities. Laws in Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Russia and Tanzania each prohibit 
certain ‘spheres of activity’.24 Our Afﬁnity Group of National 
Associations (AGNA) partner, the Uganda National NGO 
Forum (UNNGOF) reports that the Ugandan NGO Act 
has a very narrow deﬁnition of appropriate activity, which 
does not admit the policy and advocacy roles of CSOs. The 
UNNGOF further points out that under Regulation 13 of 
the amended NGO Law, NGOs have to provide seven days 
written notiﬁcation to local councils and resident direct 
commissioners before directly contacting people living in an 
area within their jurisdiction.
Our contribution from Canadian CSOs (Canadian Council 
for International Co-operation, Forest Ethics Advocacy and 
Voices–Voix) identiﬁes a rise in threats to withdraw charitable 
status from numerous CSOs, and some intrusive audits. In 
response, environmental CSO Forest Ethics Canada went so far 
as to give up its charitable status, including the tax advantages 
associated with this, so that it could continue its advocacy 
work without government interference. In India, some CSOs 
report experiencing frequent inspection visits, which can 
fuel public suspicion of CSOs, or requirements to report on 
their work to the police frequently. In Belarus and Russia, tax 
inspections are used as a tactic to disrupt CSO work.
In some countries, including many in sub-Saharan Africa, a 
challenge is the application of outdated, colonial era laws 
which are not ﬁt for purpose given contemporary realities of 
governance and the ways in which civil society has changed. 
Patchworks of different laws relating to different types of 
organisation are a related problem. An extreme example is 
that of Tanzania, which has seven different laws depending on 
the organisation type. India has a law, more than 100 years 
old, that lumps together very different organisational forms, 
while our contributions from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s Conseil National des ONGD de Développement and 
from Fiji and Guinea tell us that the law has lagged behind 
the development and growing size of CSOs. In Nepal, a 1977 
law is irrelevant given the country’s vastly changed political 
context since. The risk in such cases is that it leaves a lot open 
to interpretation, inviting political interference, and reducing 
transparency and predictability.
Further, it is sometimes the case that laws on paper are more 
enabling than the state’s current political interpretation 
and implementation of them, as our contributions from the 
Dominican Republic’s Alianza ONG and the Third Sector 
Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) suggest is the case. Our 
contribution from Cape Verde states:
“Problems do not arise from the quality of the existent legal 
framework, but from its practical application.”
They go on to draw attention to:
“The weak institutional capacity of most CSOs and the lack of 
a clear and permanent framework for dialogue between civil 
society and the state…”
ICNL also suggests some more positive, enabling legislative 
acts, including laws to simplify CSO registration and improve 
access to resources in Afghanistan and Ukraine, and the 
establishment of an independent commission to draft an 
enabling law on associations, with civil society consultation, 
in Libya. There is a corresponding need to document and share 
examples of good practice.
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It is important to continue to work on these issues, and they 
remain a core concern of CIVICUS. At the same time, we need 
to be clear that the enabling environment is about more than 
the political and legal space for civil society. The danger with 
narratives about shrinking political and legal space for civil 
society is that, while they are compelling and help to attract 
headlines about the difﬁculties of civil society operating in 
restricted spaces, they could also ultimately be disempowering. 
Sometimes in our efforts to call attention to the many 
countries where civil society faces restriction, we risk painting 
an overly simplistic picture of a world where governments 
are monolithic and all-powerful and civil society must always 
battle against the repression of minimum standards.
The challenge this implies for organisations and networks 
that campaign for civil society rights, including CIVICUS, is to 
go further than seeking the upholding of minimal standards, 
and decrying breaches in these. There is a need to promote 
greater recognition of higher standards that go beyond 
minimum provisions, and to foster dialogue about ways of 
moving closer towards these: to be more aspirational and 
offer a counter-vision.
Towards an enabling legal framework
In an enabling environment, CSO formation and operation 
should be facilitative rather than obstructive. The acquisition 
of legal status should be voluntary, and based on objective 
criteria. Registration should not be a prerequisite for access to 
universal rights of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly 
and association. CSO laws should be clear and well-deﬁned. 
The registration process should be quick, easy and inexpensive. 
There should be a deﬁned and reasonable time limit for 
registration decisions and written justiﬁcations for denials of 
status, which should be open to appeal. All acts and decisions 
affecting CSOs should be subject to fair administrative or 
independent judicial review. Reporting procedures for small, 
provincial, community-based organisations and alliances 
should be as simple as possible.25
It is against this backdrop that CIVICUS welcomes the March 
2013 landmark adoption of the UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution on Protecting Human Rights Defenders,26 as a vital 
step for creating a safer and more enabling environment for 
CSOs and human rights defenders.27 The resolution calls on 
states to ensure that registration requirements for CSOs are 
non-discriminatory, expeditious and inexpensive and allow 
for the possibility of appeal. It further calls on governments to 
ensure that reporting requirements for CSOs “do not inhibit 
functional autonomy.”
d. Government, politics and relations with 
civil society
While work on an enabling legal and policy framework is 
important, attempts to improve the conditions in which 
civil society works also require a nuanced understanding of 
political events and forces, and particularly of relationships 
between governments and CSOs. It is hard to envisage an 
enabling environment existing in contexts where there 
are high levels of political polarisation, or poor relations 
between governments and CSOs. While the laws that affect 
civil society can remain over some time, the interpretation 
of these laws is heavily inﬂuenced by politics, particularly in 
countries where the workings of democracy are hampered, 
there is inadequate separation of powers and the executive is 
the dominant power.
Political polarisation and civil society
Our contribution from Venezuela sets out how the dominance 
of the ruling party over all spheres, and the propagation of 
a state ideology, cut across the rule of law and the legal 
provisions to uphold conditions for civil society. In Cambodia, 
the strong control of the Cambodian People’s Party over all 
aspects of government is recognised as underlining the need 
for a strong and coordinated civil society in response.
Several contributions to our report draw attention to attacks 
in political rhetoric on CSOs and civil society activists, for 
example in India and Venezuela, and in recent years in Canada, 
heightened since the 2011 election that moved the right 
of centre government from minority to majority status. It 
seems in Canada there is a push to brand CSOs that engage 
in advocacy and human rights work as pursuing a radical, 
disruptive agenda with the consequence being defunding, loss 
of legal status and public denigration. Language itself is being 
redeﬁned: activism is now used by politicians as a pejorative 
term. Over the last three years, the Canadian civil society 
network Voices-Voix identiﬁed at least 115 instances of such 
political attacks, about half of which were directed at CSOs 
and human rights defenders.
The danger is that political attacks on CSOs can drive self-
censorship, weaken public trust and make the environment 
more permissive for other, more substantial attacks.
Activists under attack
In their extreme form, disenabling conditions take the form 
of extra-legal attacks, including physical attacks on and 
assassinations of civil society staff, volunteers and activists. In 
its contribution, Front Line Defenders reported on 24 human 
rights defenders (HRDs) who were killed during 2012, while at 
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least 12 journalists were murdered in Somalia alone in 2012. 
HRDs were physically attacked in some 28 countries. Front 
Line Defenders also lists cases of judicial harassment in almost 
40 countries in 2012. Particular kinds of civil society actors 
disproportionately experience threat. For example, lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) defenders are 
particularly vulnerable in many countries. Aggravating the 
situation is the reality that killings and physical attacks are 
often followed by impunity and a failure to investigate and 
convict perpetrators.
Attacks can come from a number of sources, which are not 
necessarily conﬁned to agencies of the state. They can come 
from non-state actors, such as corporations and organised 
crime, and from forces in government that can enjoy power 
beyond the scope of elected politicians, such as the military and 
police forces. Military and police groups often enjoy impunity. 
There may be links to corruption and to criminal gangs that 
have covert corporate, state and military connections. In 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, militant groups largely beyond 
state control offer a particular threat. A source of pressure on 
the conditions for civil society in India comes from both the 
Maoist Naxalite violent militants and government response to 
them. In areas where tensions between these forces exist, civil 
society work meets with more restriction, and CSO personnel 
can be targeted for violence; in the minds of the public 
and government, there is also a risk of confusion between 
legitimate civil society activity and insurgency.
One source of threat on which there is growing understanding 
is the shadowy connections that can exist between 
transnational corporations and politicians, particularly with 
agricultural, extractive and construction industries. In many 
developing countries, communities that traditionally relied 
on rivers, forests and communal lands are being displaced 
as corporations make deals with governments to acquire 
environmental resources. Environmental, land rights and 
indigenous rights activists are therefore seen as a political 
and economic threat to these interests. Responses can 
include the introduction of legislative restriction, as seems to 
be the motivation behind the recent introduction of the bill 
in Indonesia; the abuse of the judicial system to arrest and 
detain activists, as happened in 2012 with land rights activists 
in Cambodia;28 and physical attacks and assassinations of 
activists, as was the case, to give just one example from 
several, with Miller Angulo Rivera, who defended the rights 
of a forcibly displaced population in Colombia, and who was 
murdered in December 2012.29
Environmental, land rights and indigenous rights activists 
seem to be at particular risk in Latin America, and PEN 
International reports that there is also a high level of danger 
in Latin America for writers, journalists and bloggers, who, 
they remind us, are an important part of civil society:
“Writers have an audience, a readership, and an inﬂuence in 
their society. Writers and artists play a unique role in civil society 
as both ampliﬁers of diverse viewpoints and inﬂuencers.”
In 2012 PEN International monitored more than 800 cases of 
attacks against writers in 108 countries.
Trade unionists are another part of civil society who are 
particularly vulnerable to attack and restriction in some 
contexts. Here again, there seems to be a particular risk in 
Latin America, suggesting a special need to focus intervention 
and awareness-raising efforts on this region. The International 
Trade Union Confederation’s (ITUC) 2012 survey of violations 
of trade union rights indicated that 50 of the 75 trade unionists 
who were murdered in 2011 were from Latin America. The 
survey also pointed out that a disproportionately high 
percentage of trade unionists experiencing threats of some 
kind (69.8%), imprisonment (61.8%) and arrests (74.8%) 
were from Latin America.
The situation for trade unionists in Swaziland is also particularly 
difﬁcult, as our contribution from ITUC makes clear. The country 
ruled by Africa’s last absolute monarch has been in a perpetual 
Russia and the interplay between informal 
civic activism and attacks on organised 
civil society
Political shifts can offer opportunities to push for change, 
and also dangers. Clearly the assault on Russian civil 
society has increased in its ferocity since Putin was re-
elected to the presidency in March 2012, in part triggered 
by wide-scale public protest in response to an election 
widely considered ﬂawed at best, fraudulent at worst.
Many in civil society globally are rightly concerned about 
whether there is a sufﬁciently strong connection between 
apparently spontaneous protest movements and formal 
CSOs. Nevertheless, some governments clearly see one, 
and government response to mass protest sometimes 
includes attacking the space both for individual activists 
– as was the case with Russia’s harsh sentencing of Pussy 
Riot members - and also for CSOs.
As well as attempts to smear CSOs that receive 
foreign funding, discussed further below, the Russian 
government’s response to protest has included the 
introduction of new laws on libel and defamation to 
make campaigning work harder, and tightening of the 
law on public meetings and demonstrations.
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state of declared emergency since 1973. In 2012, a number 
of Swazi trade unionists were prevented from protesting, and 
detained and arrested. May Day celebrations were also blocked, 
while other trade unionists received international travel bans. 
In Turkey, almost 70 members of the trade union federation 
were in detention by the end of 2012.
Impunity for those who commit attacks can feed self-
censorship and exert a chilling effect on civil society, noted 
by contributors to our report to be the case in Azerbaijan 
and Sri Lanka, among other countries. One of the enduring 
challenges is the lack of follow-up actions to investigate 
killings of or attacks on activists. In this respect, a potentially 
welcome new development in Mexico, where a state war on 
drug gangs has seen civil society activists too often caught in 
the crossﬁre, is a law to establish independent investigation 
units for the killing of writers and journalists, although as yet 
it still lacks adequate regulations and protocols to be applied.
In response, Front Line Defenders suggests that steps to improve 
the environment for civil society activists should include new 
civil society protection mechanisms to defend and support 
activists, new multilateral processes to challenge impunity, 
and greater pressure from more progressive governments and 
donors on regimes that frequently commit offences.
The UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Protecting 
Human Rights Defenders, mentioned above, offers new hope. 
The Resolution calls on states to guarantee that national 
regulations and legislation affecting human rights defenders 
are clearly deﬁned and consistent with international human 
rights law. It further calls on governments to refrain from 
acts of reprisals, including subjecting peaceful demonstrators 
to excessive or indiscriminate use of force, arbitrary arrest 
or detention, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment, enforced disappearance and abuse 
of criminal and civil proceedings. We need also to refer back, 
and hold governments to, the commitments set out in the 
1998 Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, which sets out 
the minimum standards that should be guaranteed to human 
rights defenders.30
The politics of aid
In many countries that provide donor funding, political 
shifts and the increased volatility of politics in response to 
economic crisis have led to governments reducing, narrowing 
or refocussing ODA, a vital source of support for some CSOs 
in developing countries. After an all time high in 2010, ODA 
dropped in 2011. One trend here is the apparent strengthening 
of links between ODA and domestic trade and foreign affairs 
agendas. At the same time, there seems to be a move towards 
reintegrating previously autonomous development agencies 
into foreign ministries, as in New Zealand and, as announced in 
early 2013, Canada.
More positively in the aid sphere, there are some interesting 
examples of cross-government approaches to be tracked. 
Contributors Jacqueline Wood and Karin Fällman draw 
attention to the Civil Society Network created within 
Australia’s aid agency, AusAid, that shares information and 
learning between different staff who connect with civil 
society. AusAid also placed a staff member at the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-proﬁts Commission to create closer 
learning links with approaches to domestic civil society, 
potentially valuable in light of a push to streamline domestic 
CSOs’ regulatory obligations, They also note that Sweden’s 
aid agency, Sida, has established a similar internal network 
on civil society for headquarters and embassies as part of 
a wider ‘whole of government’ approach, while Denmark’s 
Danida designates civil society focal points in some 
embassies. In Luxembourg, regular dialogue sessions are held 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CSOs on issues 
such as Luxembourg’s aid commitments and the operational 
requirements of its support for CSOs. There are of course 
still questions about how well such approaches work in 
practice, and the extent to which they strengthen civil society 
capacity. In 2012, India introduced greater coordination 
of its international assistance programmes through the 
Development Partnership Administration: the hope is that this 
will make India’s international development agenda clearer 
and, for civil society, easier to engage with and inﬂuence.
In looking at the politics of international aid from a civil 
society perspective, we should also be sensitive to the critique 
of the ‘import model’ of civil society where, following a sudden 
political shift, such as a revolution, history has shown there 
is a tendency for civil society forms to be introduced, with 
help from donors, that mimic those in donor countries. Many 
of these introduced forms of civil society fail, including for 
the reason that conditions for their work can quickly become 
hostile, and failure can challenge the trust in and credibility of 
civil society in such contexts.31 Rather than simply supporting 
the setting up of organisations through the provision of funds, 
a focus on the enabling environment would tell us that there 
is a need to focus on developing enabling conditions, which 
take direction from and encourage rooted, indigenous and 
popular civil society forms to establish and grow.
Conﬂict and disasters: dynamic contexts
Violent conﬂict, and large-scale disasters, can shift the context 
for civil society quickly and dramatically. They are quite 
common. Our contribution from the SISA Centre for Corporate 
Partnership and Head of Secretariat of the Africa CSO Platform 
on Principled Partnership states that 60 countries are currently 
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experiencing some kind of conﬂict between the state and a 
section of society. While political contestation is part of 
legitimate democratic practice, conﬂict, particularly violent 
conﬂict, adds complexity and can be disenabling. CSOs can 
ﬁnd themselves under attack from different sides in a conﬂict. 
When the state is perceived by a section of society to be 
unable to deliver its basic functions adequately, civil society 
often ﬁnds itself in the position of substituting for the state, 
for example, in the continuance of basic services. This is a 
valuable role that civil society plays, but in polarised settings it 
creates that risk that CSOs will be seen to take sides.
As our AGNA partner, the Pakistan National Forum reports, there 
has been a signiﬁcant shift in the relations between CSOs and 
government in Pakistan, particularly in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
and the Balochistan areas, in response at least partly to a high 
level of internal conﬂict. Permission is required from the military 
for CSOs to operate in those areas, and aid workers frequently 
come under attack in several provinces in Pakistan.
Conﬂict inhibits economic and social development and 
erodes development gains. Violent conﬂict also brings 
distrust, low social cohesion, and the abandonment of norms 
and values, as can the aftermath of disasters. They thus inhibit 
participation and can fuel polarisation between different civil 
society actors, all of which can contribute to a disenabling 
environment for civil society.
As we set out in our previous State of Civil Society report, 
sudden events, such as disasters and conﬂicts, can also create 
opportunities for civil society to act with responsibility and 
ﬁll governance deﬁcits, as well as plug service provision gaps. 
Writing before rebel forces overthrew the president, our 
contribution from Central Conseil Inter ONG de Centrafrique, 
of the Central African Republic, pointed to a changed attitude 
to civil society that was perhaps too little, too late:
“As we are in a country in conﬂict, the government has begun 
to understand that only civil society can help the different 
parties to see clearly and to raise up the voice of the voiceless.”
The interaction between conﬂict and the enabling environment 
would seem to be two-way: the more opportunities there 
are for peaceful platforms and spaces for the articulation of 
different viewpoints and dialogue, and for participation - i.e. for 
a more enabled civil society - the lesser would seem to be the 
potential for conﬂict and violence. Post-conﬂict and peace-
building processes should therefore focus on strengthening 
aspects of the enabling environment, such as rebuilding trust 
and connections between people, and addressing polarisation 
and the lack of platforms for participation. This requires 
investing in civil society, and in bringing different parts of 
civil society together. In post-conﬂict settings, there may also 
be need to rebuild a culture of constitutionalism, and invest 
in constitution-building processes that help develop a more 
enabling environment for civil society. Further, more research 
and analysis needs to be done on the environment for civil 
society in contexts of fragility, both on the ways in which 
enduring fragility impacts on the environment for civil society 
and on the ways in which a more enabling environment could 
contribute to greater resilience.
Dynamics between different kinds of CSOs also should be 
acknowledged in post-conﬂict, and post-disaster, settings. 
In such contexts, CSOs tend to occupy a humanitarian and 
essential services role, but the challenges include those of 
maintaining neutrality, and of unbalanced relationships 
between large-scale international humanitarian CSOs, which 
tend to command proﬁle and have access to signiﬁcant 
resources, and smaller, local CSOs.
This is of course an issue more broadly: our contributions 
from the Central African Republic, Guinea and Nepal tell us 
that cooperation between international and local CSOs is 
limited in their contexts, characterised by what is in effect 
unfair competition. InterAction, in its contribution, suggests 
some elements of good practice that could be helpful here, 
recognising those US humanitarian CSOs that:
“…make long-term commitment, acquire a deep understanding 
of local societies, employ largely local staff and design projects 
with community participation and cultural sensitivity to ensure 
sustainability.”
In post-conﬂict settings in particular, the vital work of 
rebuilding trust, relationships and spaces needs local civil 
society participation, not least to rebuild trust and conﬁdence 
within civil society itself. Donor inﬂows that only go through 
large international CSOs in post-conﬂict and post disaster 
contexts will do little to develop local civil society capacity.
The politics of policy dialogue
Advocacy and policy-oriented CSOs face a particular 
challenge of how to take sufﬁcient interest in and engage 
robustly with the political sphere without being seen to be 
partisan or playing into the hands of political critics. In two-
party or multi-party contexts, CSOs need to try to engage 
positively with parties both in government and opposition, 
without being seen to be taking sides and actively seeking to 
change an incumbent government, as our contribution from 
the Central African Republic reports has been the case:
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“When civil society adopts a position on an issue that is similar 
to that of the opposition, it is considered to be the extension 
of the opposition. If civil society’s position is similar to that of 
the government, the opposition believes that civil society is an 
appendix of power.”
Some contributions to our report recognise that the culture 
of political dialogue, especially between civil society and 
government, still needs to be built and encouraged in 
countries with little democratic heritage, such as Azerbaijan, 
Belarus and Russia. The task is not only one of developing 
space and processes for constructive dialogue in the political 
sphere, but also of developing respect for pluralism and of 
moving away from the ‘winner takes all’ politics that also 
characterise many sub-Saharan African contexts, where the 
expression of oppositional viewpoints is branded as disloyal 
rather than a contribution to healthy debate. In Turkey, TUSEV 
suggests that outdated perceptions about civil society need 
to be challenged as well:
“CSOs in Turkey should not only be perceived as charity or 
service providing organisations, but their legitimacy as rights-
based organisations which engage in awareness raising and 
advocacy activities should also be recognised. This change in 
perception regarding CSOs is necessary to engage CSOs in all 
levels of policy and decision-making processes.”
Civil society plays multiple roles. We bring people together. 
We encourage debate, dialogue and consensus building. 
We research, analyse, document, publish and promote 
knowledge and learning. We develop, articulate and seek to 
advance solutions to problems. We engage with people and 
organisations in other spheres, such as government and 
business, to try to advance and implement solutions. We 
directly deliver services to those who need them. Sometimes 
we do all of these things at once. We need to assert that these 
are all legitimate civil society roles.
We need, in our own analysis and strategies, to take a similarly 
disaggregated approach to government. As noted in our 
contribution from Reality of Aid Africa, different departments 
may have different attitudes, as may the individual ministers 
and ofﬁcials within these:
“The value of CSO participation in policy formulation processes 
seems to be better understood and appreciated within some 
speciﬁc departments… Some government departments see 
CSOs as partners in both policy development and service 
provision. For others, CSOs are seen as a potential agent for 
outsourcing some government services, but for others still they 
are mere noisemakers.”
In governments, ministers often come and go fairly rapidly. 
However, ofﬁcials can be entrenched. These kind of relationships 
between elected and appointed ofﬁcials need to be better 
examined and understood.
We must understand that governments contain a range of 
levers and opportunities, as well as sources of challenge. In 
Europe and North America, although the donor agencies 
of government often show greater identiﬁcation with civil 
society than other parts of government, they are usually 
not particularly powerful voices within government, and as 
mentioned above, in a number of contexts we are currently 
seeing their status downgraded or challenged.
We should also bear in mind that in some contexts different 
forms of governance exist side by side. Our contribution on 
participatory governance in Paciﬁc island countries highlights 
the role of traditional authorities in policy-making processes. 
Traditional authorities enjoy high public trust, but there are 
gaps between traditional systems and modern governance 
structures, as well as with civil society, which need to be 
bridged in order to improve collaborative decision-making.
Towards better CSO-government relations and 
democratic ownership
We should call attention to examples of government good 
practice in improving the engagement of civil society and 
promoting democratic ownership when these arise, as 
potential examples of contributions towards a more enabling 
environment. Countries in Eurasia are generally acknowledged 
to have among the worst environments for civil society, 
but the Forum of Women’s NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, in its 
contribution, details the creation of Public Watch Councils 
(PWCs), which were established by Presidential Decree in 
2012. The contributor highlights the dual roles of PWCs:
“…the activities of the PWCs were guided by the following two 
main functions: a consultative role (give recommendations 
to a state body on improvement of its work, offering an 
alternative strategy or mechanism, and holding public 
hearings); and a watchdog role (monitoring the use of the 
budget and other funds, the conduct of tendering processes, 
and compliance with legislation by the state).”
The PWCs enable the civil society personnel who are 
represented on them to hold state bodies more accountable. 
They represent an innovation that, while naturally still leaving 
areas for improvement, should be engaged with, tracked and 
documented. There is of course a need for continual oversight 
and analysis, particularly to ensure any such positive 
recognition is not used by governments to legitimise other 
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less progressive aspects of their practice. This is an area where 
international networks, such as CIVICUS, need to help.
Contributors to our report recognise that some other 
governments are making efforts to improve relationships with 
civil society, and it is important to examine what mechanisms 
are offered to take engagements with governments beyond 
the ad hoc level. Our contribution from the Lithuanian 
national CSO platform, NGO Information and Support 
Centre, highlighted one apparently progressive mechanism. 
Since 2010, there has been a compact for CSO development, 
which has been approved by the government. The multi-
stakeholder joint Commission for Coordination of NGO Affairs 
regularly convenes to discuss legal, ﬁnancial and other topical 
issues, with representation of the national NGO coalition, 
formed in 2010 from 14 national associations covering all 
major thematic areas. In Guinea, the Platform of NGOs and 
Associative Movements (POME) exists as a representative and 
advisory body that is regularly consulted by the government.
We believe that good models of cooperation share 
characteristics: they are regular, they are transparent in their 
selection criteria for participants, they reach a diverse range 
of civil society, they reach across governments, they make 
information available to their participants and they exist over 
time, detached from party politics and electoral cycles. While 
the diversity of civil society should be recognised as a key 
asset, these examples also tend to show the value of forging 
common civil society voices to speak to government.
A potentially replicable idea on the part of governments, 
drawing from the examples from Australia and India 
mentioned above, would be to improve coordination and 
share good practice within governments on engagement 
with civil society, and particularly in donor countries, to make 
connections between good practice in engagement with 
domestic civil society, where this exists, and in support for civil 
society in developing countries. Networks of CSOs concerned 
with international development in donor countries could 
also connect better with CSO networks that concentrate on 
domestic civil society issues. But alongside this we need to 
seek direct and multiple entry channels for CSOs to engage 
with different parts of government as relevant, so that any 
coordinating bodies do not act as gatekeepers.
It is evident that governments and donors need to be held to 
account more closely for their responsibility to create a more 
enabling environment at the national level. This responsibility 
includes offering structured and institutionalised roles for civil 
society within government and donor policy development 
processes. Governments should acknowledge CSOs as civic 
actors in their own right and should interact with CSOs, based 
on principles of mutual trust, respect and shared responsibility.
e. Public attitudes and participation
There needs to be more research and analysis on economic 
inﬂuences on the environment for civil society, and how 
these play out in different contexts. The environment for civil 
society is also shaped by aspects of the physical environment, 
such as the geography of a country, its size and location, 
whether it is an island or landlocked and its changing climate. 
The extent and reach of its diaspora play a role also. These 
all interact in complex ways with social attitudes that can 
have deep and intertwined roots, inﬂuenced by culture and 
faith, and make each national context different. Here factors 
can include the strength and make-up of religious beliefs and 
competing beliefs, the existence of and relations between 
groups of different identity, culture, ethnicity, tribe and social 
class, and prevailing social mores about issues such as the 
status of women and tolerance of different groups, such as 
sexual minorities.
Gender, LGBTI, disability and discrimination
Social attitudes as well as political forces can affect the space 
for and viability of civil society groups and actions that make 
particular claims, such as those that attempt to empower 
women, address discrimination or seek equality on the basis 
of sexual identity or disability. They also provide us a pointer 
towards the broader environment for civil society: if a country 
cannot offer an enabling environment for women’s rights 
organisations, it should tell us that something more broadly 
is wrong.
The evidence from contributions to our report tells us that in 
many contexts, something indeed is wrong. Women human 
rights defenders, and CSOs that seek to advance women 
rights, seem to be among the top targets for attacks on civil 
society. For example, the AWID reports that between 2010 
and 2012, at least 24 women’s human rights defenders were 
recorded as murdered in Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico 
alone, while one of 2012’s most shocking moments came 
in the attempted assassination in Pakistan of 14-year old 
education activist Malala Yousafzai.
In Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, new laws, policies 
or initiatives were proposed or carried out in 2012 that would 
severely curtail LGBTI activism, while in Uganda attempts 
were made to reintroduce a notoriously anti-gay bill.32 The 
2012 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association’s State-Sponsored Homophobia report indicates 
that 78 countries out of 193 still have legislation criminalising 
same-sex consensual acts between adults.33
Further, our contribution from the Advisory Council on Youth 
of the Council of Europe reports that hate crime in Europe is 
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on the rise, a trend that points to more difﬁcult conditions 
for civil society groups associated with particular identities 
that are targeted in hate crimes. According to data from two 
reports released by the EU’s Agency for Fundamental Rights 
in November 2012, every one in four people of a minority or 
immigrant group in Europe has been a victim of a hate crime 
within the past year.34
A related issue on discrimination and marginalisation is the 
extent to which those organisations and individuals seeking 
to advance rights for marginalised groups, such as women and 
LGBTI people, and people with disabilities, are included in the 
mainstream of civil society itself. Our contribution from the 
International Disability and Development Consortium (IDDC) 
suggests that the position is often unsatisfactory:
“…misconceptions, stigmas and stereotypes about disability 
as well as inaccessible environments create barriers for people 
with disabilities from attaining their right to full and equal 
participation in civil society.”
As members of civil society, we need to take care not to 
consciously or unconsciously propagate paradigms of 
exclusion. There seems to be a real need for more analysis and 
promotion of the connections between CSOs and activists 
that are seeking rights for marginalised groups, and other 
parts of civil society.
One particularly complex area for analysis is the strength 
and roles of faith groupings. In most contexts, and consistent 
with our working deﬁnition of civil society, we would consider 
faith-based organisations and groupings as a valuable part 
of civil society, representing sources of social capital and 
community organisation and offering platforms for collective 
participation. Our contribution on participatory governance 
in the Paciﬁc islands draws attention to the important role 
of the church, alongside traditional leaders, in people’s lives.
The complicating issue is that religious institutions, 
particularly religious leaders, can also be powerful sources 
of non-progressive rhetoric that can cut across the efforts of 
other parts of civil society. For example, some contributions 
to our report see a connection between an apparent rise in 
religious fundamentalism in some countries and a heightened 
targeting of women’s and LGBTI activism. Front Line Defenders 
reports fundamentalism affecting human rights defenders in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, where clerics made threats 
against women human rights defenders and CSOs working 
on women’s human rights.35 In some countries, governments 
seem unable to protect civil society groups that speak up 
against conservative social values, patriarchy and religious 
fundamentalism. As the contribution from AWID makes clear, 
ﬁghting these attacks drains energy and resources that would 
otherwise be spent on advancing more progressive agendas.
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Trust and participation
Public trust in civil society remains a key asset that should 
be considered part of the enabling environment. On most 
available data, such as the annual Edelman Trust Barometer, 
NGOs (to use the Barometer’s terminology) have consistently 
scored higher levels of trust than governments, companies or 
the media, for the past ﬁve years.
Levels of public participation are another important factor 
that we need to track continually, including through such tools 
as the CIVICUS Civil Society Index. An enabling environment 
can be characterised as one that makes it easy for people to 
participate in diverse ways in a range of different civil society 
opportunities. This suggests that levels of public participation 
can offer one indicator of whether there is a sufﬁciently 
enabling environment.
But a note of caution should be struck here: mass participation 
in public protest events is, of course, also an indicator 
of dissatisfaction, which can include dissatisfaction with 
political and social exclusion and the inadequacy of formal 
channels of political participation. This was the case in many 
of the Arab Spring protests. Indeed, there are occasions when 
mass protest can be an indicator of a deﬁcit in CSO response, 
poor routes into participation through existing civil society, or 
perceptions that CSOs do not offer a relevant platform for the 
articulation of a particular demand. These deﬁcits can occur 
as a result of the kind of restrictions on CSOs discussed above.
Our contribution from SERI, a CSO based in South Africa, 
suggests that the burgeoning of local protests in South Africa 
is a sign that people do not see formal participation platforms 
as adequate. They found many CSOs wanting in their 
response to 2012’s Marikana incident, when the police shot 
dead 34 striking miners. This gap points to a wider insufﬁcient 
CSO response to signiﬁcant socio-economic challenges in 
South Africa, and a disconnection between formal CSOs and 
the country’s burgeoning local protest movements. They 
also draw attention to political manipulation of the criminal 
justice system and the relative weakness of CSOs in relation 
to the dominant party state and its political structures.
Large-scale protest movements offer a reminder that the 
environment for civil society is dynamic, and moments of 
sudden opportunity arise. Outbreaks of protest are volcanic 
and can create volatile new space, but after they are brought 
under control, it should not be assumed that the dissatisfaction 
that drove them has gone away. Perhaps the lost momentum 
of some of the headline protests of the last couple of years 
points to a need to invest in existing organised forms of civil 
society, and particularly actions that improve their conditions 
and connections, sooner, to maintain the momentum gained 
from mass protest and address the grievances behind protests.
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Looking for local tipping points
There is little civil society can do to change a country’s 
geography. For example, small island states face particular 
issues of vulnerability, including high exposure to the impacts 
of natural disasters, unequal relationships with stronger 
neighbours and a particular reliance on diasporas.
However, we do need to take locally speciﬁc factors such as 
these into account when we seek to understand and improve 
the environment for civil society. To some extent, they can 
deﬁne the space available and the best intervention methods, 
and remind us that the knowledge of local civil society is a 
key asset. They also prompt the recognition that forces other 
than government, politicians, donors and civil society can 
inﬂuence the conditions for civil society. While it is essential 
to hold onto global norms such as those enshrined in the 
International Bill of Human Rights, the existence of locally 
speciﬁc factors suggest that global standards for a civil 
society enabling environment must be sufﬁciently adaptable 
to local realities, cultures and attitudes. An ideal environment 
for civil society will be one that blends global standards with 
an understanding of local nuances.
What this suggests, from the point of view of strategy, is 
that civil society, and civil society stakeholders, in seeking to 
inﬂuence the enabling environment, need to identify not only 
the most important things they wish to inﬂuence, but also 
the places and moments where there is most opportunity 
to make change. These must be context-speciﬁc, linked 
to moments of what may be fast-moving opportunity and 
the levels of work at which action is possible. The more we 
understand of national and sub-national context, the better. It 
is also important for progressive civil society activists striving 
for positive social change in challenging environments to 
work with respected social and political actors that are likely 
to inﬂuence others, in order to reach a tipping point at which 
broader society is more likely to embrace change.
It should be understood here that while it is important to 
understand public attitudes, even seemingly entrenched 
attitudes can be dynamic and can be challenged: they are not 
necessarily dead weights against change. It may be a question 
of reading when the moment is right. For example, in two 
generations the position of lesbian and gay people in the UK 
has progressed, recently very quickly, from criminalisation to 
a parliamentary vote in favour of gay marriage, with opinion 
poll data showing public attitudes that are largely accepting 
of same-sex partnerships, in stark contrast to widespread 
stigmatisation in the past.36
f. Corruption
It is much harder for civil society to operate properly in 
conditions where there is a high level of corruption.
INTRAC’s contribution to our report uses the example of 
the anti-corruption movement in India to highlight the 
multifaceted impact of corruption, as well as the need for a 
broad response. It says of the movement:
“It cut across traditional divisive lines of caste, class, ethnicity 
and religion. People across these lines realised that corruption 
affects everyone in society, from the poorest peasant who 
cannot access a government employment scheme, to a middle 
class family expected to pay a bribe to get their daughter 
into college, to the large company where corruption adds 
unacceptable costs to their transactions.”
Corruption is so pervasive that in some contexts it makes it 
difﬁcult for civil society to work in conventional ways. For 
example, our contributor from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo simply states:
“It is difﬁcult to give a comprehensive response in a country 
where corruption has reached the level of no return and where 
bad governance has become a management system.”
Our contribution from a Ugandan social development specialist 
explores the impact of corruption on the interaction between 
civil society, government and donors. It is acknowledged at an 
ofﬁcial level that there is a high level of corruption among 
state ofﬁcials and politicians, as documented in Auditor 
General’s reports. This has caused donors to freeze support and 
the government to recognise corruption as a serious problem.
The question then arises as to why there is not more common 
ground between CSOs and government in tackling the issue, 
given an apparently shared problem diagnosis. Why then are 
Ugandan CSOs staging their ‘Black Monday’ weekly public 
anti-corruption campaigns being attacked? Our contributor 
notes that:
“[T]he stance of donors can be characterised as looking 
‘noble and appalled’ by the extent of the corruption, while 
the government is evidently seeking to look tough and serious 
about capturing the culprits. CSOs seem to be the losers here: 
they stand on a slippery surface in a political and ﬁnancing 
environment in which money seems to speak more than the 
rights of people to receive the development beneﬁts due to 
them through government programmes.”
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What we seem to be seeing here is that one dysfunctional 
aspect of the environment for civil society in Uganda – 
strained relationships and apparently growing distrust 
between CSOs and government – is inhibiting effective action 
on another area of dysfunction – corruption. In such settings, 
speaking out against corruption can be a risky act for civil 
society activists, as Faustin Ndikumana, head of a CSO that 
advocates transparency and accountability in Burundi found 
out when he was detained for two weeks in February 2012.37
Our contribution from Guinea further makes a connection 
between poor governance and ﬁnancial support, which has 
repercussions for CSOs:
“…the Republic of Guinea spent nearly 10 years on the bench 
of insolvent countries mainly due to bad governance. During 
these years, technical and ﬁnancial partners have been very 
shy in ﬁnancing CSOs.”
Freedom from corruption as part of the enabling 
environment
For an enabling environment to exist, there must a low level 
of corruption among ofﬁcials of the state, business, politicians 
and other social actors, including civil society personnel 
themselves. Open and timely access to information and 
transparent accountability mechanisms and processes are 
necessary. It should be easy to expose corruption, including 
through investigative journalism, and instances of corruption 
should be addressed through the criminal justice system, 
without political interference.
g. Communications and technology
If one of our concerns in promoting and seeking to enable 
civil society is to encourage space for public debate and 
dialogue, and the articulation of solutions, then naturally 
we need to take an interest in communication. The extent 
to which civil society can communicate, including through 
internet and mobile technology, is another important aspect 
of the environment for civil society.
Threats to online civic space
The role of the information and communications technology 
(ICTs) in people’s mobilisations such as the Arab Spring has 
been much discussed, not least in our previous State of Civil 
Society report. We have seen the multiple value of online 
communication for civil society, including for the exercise of 
social accountability; the crowdsourcing of activism, including 
through platforms such as Avaaz, and the formation of new 
civil society communities online; the enabling of international 
solidarity; the real-time organisation of ofﬂine protest; and 
citizen journalism, among others. Our contributors from 
Finland, Kepa and Kehys, also call attention to the role of ICTs 
in providing new channels of engagement with civil society, 
politicians and civil servants.
The darker side of the online world also should be acknowledged 
here. Our contribution from the Advisory Council on Youth of 
the Council of Europe, as mentioned above, sets out how the 
internet and social media are being used as mechanisms to 
propagate hate speech and incite hate crimes. The response 
of the Advisory Council of Youth, underlining the role of 
the internet as a key arena for contestation, has been to 
spearhead a youth-led campaign, ‘Young People Combating 
Hate Speech Online’, to promote social and cultural tolerance 
and inclusion.
As our contribution from the Association for Progressive 
Communications (APC) points out, online access continues 
to grow, including through mobile phones. The internet has 
created new platforms for self-expression, but in turn this 
has created new vulnerability risks for those who use these 
platforms. As APC states:
“The revolutions in North Africa have shown how social media 
can be an ally in the organisation and mobilisation of people, 
but also how authoritarian regimes use the internet to counter 
progressive social and political change.”
A few of many recent examples include arrests and 
imprisonment for tweeting and blogging, including of civil 
society leader Nabeel Rajab in Bahrain, and also of activists in 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; infamous 
and continuing internet censorship in China; interruption 
of SMS services in India; and tracking of cybercafé users in 
South Korea. Ethiopian blogger Eskinder Nega received an 
18-year prison sentence after becoming unpopular with the 
repressive government, apparently for writing a series of pieces 
on the Arab Spring. APC cites that about 32% of all users have 
experienced some kind of national-level restriction, and over 
45 states have imposed restrictions of some kind.
The danger is that new international norms on internet 
control are being steadily and stealthily established, justiﬁed 
by references to security and crime, and exercised through 
such means as surveillance, censorship and blocking of access. 
A related emerging area for alarm is the interaction between 
governments and businesses in internet control. Governments 
often ﬁnd service, content and platform providers compliant 
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in requests to block and ﬁlter content. Internet freedom 
should therefore represent a growing area of interest for civil 
society and those who seek to support civil society.
We have also seen welcome citizen activism to protect online 
civic space. Freedom House’s 2012 Freedom on the Net report 
notes that stringent opposition by concerned citizens in Europe 
to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) prompted 
governments to back away from ratifying the treaty.38 Our 
Estonian AGNA member, the Network of Estonian Nonproﬁt 
Organisations, reports that non-formal networks of like-
minded people such as the ‘Estonian Internet Community’ 
played a crucial role in opposing ACTA. In the US, 2012 protests 
by civil society, in conjunction with advocacy by technology 
companies that included the synchronised blacking out of 
websites such as Wikipedia, helped stop the passage of Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA).
Internet governance, however, remains an opaque area and 
beyond the everyday concerns of many CSOs. The scope 
for civil society participation in decision-making forums on 
internet governance is very limited, and expanding this should 
be an area for collective advocacy. Rather than focussing 
on restriction, legislation should seek to enable access and 
promote the internet’s public role and global commons 
nature. One new campaigning tool that provides a potential 
rallying point is PEN International’s 2012 Declaration on 
Digital Freedom.39
Making meaningful messages through mainstream 
media
Engagement with conventional media remains as important 
a question as ever before, with the line between conventional 
media and the internet being increasingly blurred as media 
organisations have moved into digital platforms. In spite of 
the rise of the internet, a handful of large companies continue 
to own the bulk of the media landscape, as our report’s joint 
contribution from the Inter Press Service (IPS) and the Citizen 
Lab makes clear. The diversity of voices continues to be 
limited, with viewpoints from large and developed countries 
dominating news and commentary media.
There are also success stories in civil society advocacy for media 
reform, and there is a need to share successful experiences, 
and encourage more CSOs to take an interest in issues of 
media ownership and access to media platforms. This is an 
area where our contributors suggest closer engagement with 
academia would bring beneﬁt, as here there is solid expertise 
and research. For example, the Argentinian media law, which 
assigns 30% of the airwaves to community media, has its 
origins in a draft formed by a CSO/academia partnership.
No communications infrastructure can beneﬁt CSOs unless 
we in civil society are media-savvy. This applies to both new 
and traditional media. As discussed in our previous State 
of Civil Society report, there has been a failure by many 
traditional CSOs to capitalise on the mobilising power of new 
media, mimicking continuing inadequacies in approaches to 
ofﬂine media. The joint contribution by IPS and the Citizen 
Lab attributes this partly to the fact that:
“Social media and blogging platforms, by privileging an 
individualistic approach to communication, are sometimes at 
odds with the ways in which organised civil society traditionally 
communicates.”
This is not the only area of civil society difﬁculty here. In 
civil society we seem resigned to the fact that matters of 
importance to us will not attract mainstream media coverage. 
However, we cannot attribute this only to media bias. Our 
contributors point to the poor quality of many traditional 
CSO communications tools, such as press releases, the lack of 
follow up in communications and an absence of collaboration 
between CSOs to make strategic joint contributions. There is 
a need for CSOs to develop capacity to adapt messages to the 
characteristics and needs of different information channels.
An enabling communications environment
An enabling environment for civil society should see fair 
access for civil society voices to media platforms. Given the 
value of online civic space, citizen activists and CSOs should 
continue to lobby governments and internet companies to 
ensure that restrictions on websites and social media do 
not violate the parameters of international law. Citizen 
activists and CSOs need to demand that their national 
telecommunications infrastructure and service providers 
guarantee affordable mobile and internet access for all. This 
needs to be underpinned by guarantees of media freedom and 
freedom of information, and the protection of investigative 
journalists, bloggers and others who expose wrongdoing.
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h. Resources
Resourcing is another key feature of the environment 
in which civil society operates. An enabling resourcing 
environment could be deﬁned as one that supports the 
creation and sustaining of multiple resourcing streams for the 
self-determined programmes and priorities of civil society in 
its diverse forms, including from sources other than donor 
agencies, such as from citizens and communities in a CSO’s 
own country.
The legal and regulatory environment for civil 
society ﬁnancing
The question of resourcing is clearly connected with that 
of the legal and regulatory environment discussed above. 
The law is sometimes skewed towards the granting of tax 
concessions to charitable acts and service delivery, but not 
for civil society work that may have more of a political edge. 
Our contributors tell us is the case in India and Turkey, where 
TUSEV indicates that:
“Tax exemptions and public beneﬁt statuses are granted to a 
very limited number of CSOs through the Council of Ministers 
decision. Therefore, this decision which must be unbiased 
and objective in nature becomes extremely political, and the 
privileges it provides are very limited.”
It seems an enduring fact that some types of CSOs, such as 
those that mostly have a policy, human rights or advocacy 
focus, struggle to raise domestic resources and therefore 
rely signiﬁcantly on funding from sources in other countries. 
Attempts to limit the foreign funding supply to such CSOs have 
therefore become a tactic for governments that seek to silence 
civil society critics. According to ICNL data, measures have 
been taken within the past 12 years to restrict access to foreign 
funding in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, 
China, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Jordan, Nepal, 
Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.40 In Ethiopia, it 
remains the case that CSOs that receive more than 10% of 
funding from foreign sources are not allowed to undertake 
advocacy or human rights work. In October 2012, Ethiopia’s 
supreme court upheld the freezing of the assets of two of the 
country’s last functioning human rights CSOs.41
ICNL suggests that there is a ‘contagion effect’ with governments 
following inﬂuential examples set by others, including in draft 
laws that limit receipt of foreign funding in Malaysia and 
Pakistan, and the expansion of existing restrictions in Bangladesh 
and Egypt.42 In Pakistan, the politician behind a draft law to limit 
foreign funding explicitly referenced Egypt’s restrictions as good 
practice. The concern is that regressive international norms are 
being established.
Severe measures were recently introduced or threatened in 
Russia.43 In what seems a clear move to discredit CSOs and 
undermine their trust among the public, CSOs receiving foreign 
funding are now required to register and report themselves 
as ‘foreign agents’. This was accompanied by the expulsion 
of the US aid agency USAID from Russia in October 2012. In 
response to these measures, CSOs in Russia are ﬁghting back, 
including through boycotting registration as foreign agents 
and bringing their case to national and international courts.
We can draw hope from one recent successful example of a 
civil society response, in the Dominican Republic. Our AGNA 
partner, Alianza ONG, reports that the government tabled a 
law that attempted to impose new taxes on CSOs and reduce 
their tax beneﬁts. Accepting the rationale of civil society groups 
of the importance of tax exemptions in ﬁnancing their work, 
the national congress rejected the government’s proposal.
Political and economic shifts and civil society 
resources
Attacks in political rhetoric often use funding sources to 
discredit CSOs, in tactics that seem deliberately to conﬂate 
the receipt of donor funding from a country with promotion 
of that country’s viewpoints. Canadian CSOs working on 
environmental issues have been branded as puppets of the US 
foundations from which they receive ﬁnancial support, and 
Venezuelan CSOs receiving US funding dismissed as servants 
of empire and proﬁt-seekers.
What seems a current and growing preoccupation by 
governments with CSOs’ funding arrangements has led to 
the disenabling conditions of unpredictability and volatility. 
In 2012, over 4,000 Indian CSOs had their permits to receive 
foreign funding withdrawn. Abrupt withdrawal of federal 
government funding to CSOs in Brazil for a period in 2011 
demonstrated the vulnerability of CSOs to this volatility.
In some donor countries, resourcing shifts include the withdrawal 
of previously long-standing support to domestic CSOs that 
champion international development causes, and renewed 
questioning of the role of such CSOs in development, as we 
have seen recently in countries such as Canada, the Netherlands 
and New Zealand. In Canada the government abruptly withdrew 
funding for organisations engaged in policy development and 
advocacy, after more than 40 years of support in some cases. 
CSOs in developed countries that champion development 
have faced funding cuts in the past years, noted by our AGNA 
partners the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations and 
the Lithuanian NGO Information and Support Centre.
39
There is a debate to be had about the extent to which CSOs in 
developed countries are effective channels to help ODA ﬂow 
towards poor people in developing countries, and about the 
continuing role of CSOs in donor countries as development 
intermediaries in times when technology is offering new ways 
of making connections and transferring resources between 
countries.44 We should also be aware of the potentially 
negative effects of a signiﬁcant reduction in ODA channelled 
through Northern CSOs, which could include a loss of solidarity 
between developed country CSOs and developing country 
CSOs, and of development awareness in developed countries. 
As our contributors Jacqueline Wood and Karin Fällman tell us:
“It is… time for collective thought and experimentation within 
existing modalities and with alternative, complementary 
models, realising that the use of one modality does not 
exclude the other. An honest and comprehensive overview 
of the relative advantages of direct and indirect funding to 
developing country CSOs is required, avoiding the risk of 
undermining CSO-CSO relationships or creating unnecessary 
competition, but taking account of the current reality of the 
state and aspirations of developing country civil society.”
There also seems to be a growing tendency for government 
donors to provide direct support to developing country 
governments, often pooling their approaches to do so, as 
reported for example in The Central African Republic , Ghana, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.
While justiﬁcations for such practices make reference to the 
need for aid efﬁciency, they impact on the resourcing position 
and status of CSOs, which can transition from receiving 
funding directly from and dialoguing with donors to being in 
the position of asking donor-supported national governments 
for ﬁnancial support. As we heard from RESOCIDE in Burkina 
Faso, this is not a promising scenario for the autonomy of 
civil society, and a disempowering one in countries where 
governments and CSOs have poor relationships.
CSOs can often be seen as competitors for resources, and in 
some countries governments still have a sense that national 
development frameworks should trump other development 
approaches, and that donor funds when applied to CSOs 
should still align with government development frameworks. 
For example, our contribution from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo tells us that:
“Despite the existence of the Paris Declaration, the country 
is trying to organise, coordinate and analyse development 
assistance at the ministry level...”
Our contributors tell us that we are also seeing changes 
in the ways in which donors make their funds available to 
CSOs, which implies an altered relationship. In India, our 
contributor states that most access to government projects 
is now through open tendering, an unrealistic prospect for 
many smaller CSOs. A switch from the giving of grants to 
the provision of fees for services, which our contribution from 
InterAction notes to be happening in the US, implies less a 
relationship of equals and more of an authority-contractor 
relationship. InterAction’s contribution tells us:
“InterAction members report that USAID ﬁeld missions often 
view all US NGOs as implementers to be tightly controlled 
rather than true partners with expertise and experience in their 
own right. This is reﬂected in increasingly prescriptive funding 
solicitations, mandates to insist on preferred NGO stafﬁng 
structures and overly burdensome reporting requirements.”
Further, a case is still pending in the American Supreme Court 
about whether US CSOs receiving USAID funding should 
promote US government views, a notion which can only play 
into the hands of critics of CSOs that receive US funding. 
Straightforward grant-giving to CSO programmes is reported 
as having become rare in Canada as well as the US.
Inﬂuences here seem to be not merely the global economic 
crisis, but also the political response to it. Further, we need 
to ask whether a high focus on the MDGs in recent years has 
ushered in a drift back towards technical and quantitative 
target-driven approaches to development, after a period at the 
end of the last century when development was beginning to be 
understood as more about enabling of participatory governance 
to unlock local solutions and actions. A further key weakness 
of the MDG framework is that it did not mandate a speciﬁc 
role for CSOs in the delivery of its goals and targets, meaning 
CSOs have had to seek participation where possible, rather 
than have it as a right. A drive for efﬁciency, ‘value for money’ 
and visible deliverables, while understandable, not least in a 
context where development funding may need to be justiﬁed 
to sceptical donor country publics living with public service 
cuts45 and increased unemployment,46 suggests a limiting of 
the innovation and possibility that civil society can bring.
Our contribution from a Ugandan social development 
specialist calls attention to the continuing problem that 
high donor dependency limits CSOs’ autonomy and, to some 
extent, sets the parameters of operations of many CSOs and 
their outputs, demanding a priority on clearing donor hurdles. 
How can CSOs that are heavily donor dependent then assert 
their independence when dealing with government? Alongside 
these concerns there is the danger, when attacks on advocacy 
come at the same time as difﬁcult funding conditions, that 
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the response will be pre-emptive self-censorship and a loss 
of critical voice and innovation on the part of civil society. 
Our report’s contribution from the International Trade Union 
Confederation also notes a dampening effect of the economic 
crisis on the potential for trade union activism.
Tightening conditions and signiﬁcant reductions in funding for 
CSO-determined programming should be seen as disenabling 
for civil society. Our contribution from the Reality of Aid Africa 
makes the point that donor frameworks imposed to manage 
funds tend to be about the minimisation of perceived risks 
rather than enabling CSOs to achieve more. One example 
from AWID of how to counteract heavy donor conditions 
shows the value of a collective civil society response: 
women’s organisations came together to negotiate with 
the Dutch MDG3 fund, which agreed to adjust burdensome 
administrative and reporting requirements.
A further funding trend identiﬁed by our contributors from 
Brazil and the Dominican Republic is donor withdrawal from 
countries that are now assessed as middle-income countries, 
including those of the Caribbean and Latin America, even 
though there is growing awareness of the problems of severe 
income inequality within apparently wealthy and middle-
income countries. As our contribution from INTRAC reﬂects:
“For some CSOs this change from being aided to unaided is 
leading to organisational closure, and for others a new focus 
and reﬂection on roles. By default, these debates are also 
now starting to be felt within the larger INGOs [international 
CSOs], who are simultaneously also withdrawing from some 
parts of the world, particularly in Latin America, but are still 
seeking a growth in their international brands.”
Other apparent trends noted include the continuing uses by 
donors of developing country CSOs in instrumental ways 
without addressing underlying capacity issues; the use of local 
CSOs as recruiting grounds for international CSO and donor 
staff, which again creates capacity problems; and apparently 
creeping connection between the development and military 
spheres, for example in the US.
Bridging the civil society-private sector divide
Compared to civil society, from some of our contributions 
emerges a sense that private sector is often privileged by 
governments and donors. Is more attention being paid to the 
enabling environment for business than for civil society? We 
see, for example, many governments relaxing laws to encourage 
business at the same time as tightening them for civil society. 
There also remains a corresponding need to examine how 
the private sector can help to shape the environment for civil 
society, and to assess to what extent gains are made from 
partnering with the private sector.
A positive move in this regard may include India’s recent 
stipulation that private companies spend 2% of their proﬁts 
on corporate social responsibility. InterAction also suggests 
that there needs to be more civil society inclusion in public-
private partnerships:
“If the US is to truly maximise the contributions of CSOs to 
development, it needs meaningfully to engage US NGOs in its 
public-private partnerships and major private sector initiatives.”
Building resilient, diverse, local funding streams
The vulnerability of CSOs to the critique of being foreign 
agents suggests a need to ﬁnd new ways of cracking the 
difﬁcult challenge of securing sufﬁcient domestic resourcing 
so that reliance on foreign support can be reduced. In countries 
with limited practice of domestic, individual philanthropy, 
and at a time when the effects of the global economic crisis 
are still being felt, this is hardly an easy task.
There are some examples of success set out in our 
contributions. CSOs in Estonia report that they are looking to 
diversify by turning to the private sector, income generating 
activities and social enterprises. Our contribution from 
Norway reports that two thirds of Norwegian civil society’s 
income is self-generated, while our contribution from the 
Dominican Republic suggests that most CSO funding comes 
from income generation, indicating that they are developing 
sustainability mechanisms that others could learn from.
However, structural constraints in the legal and regulatory 
environment are a major impediment to the creation of 
stronger domestic funding mechanisms, as ABONG highlights 
is the case in Brazil. Given the funding constraints for CSOs 
described above, it is especially important to have legal and 
regulatory frameworks that encourage local philanthropy and 
offer favourable tax regimes for CSOs.
Possible further parts of the solution may lie in the building 
of common agendas with domestic CSOs engaged on other 
issues – for example, with CSOs engaged in offering services to 
the vulnerable, which are not necessarily seen as political, as 
suggested earlier in our contribution from Russia - or with the 
kinds of community philanthropy networks seen as emerging 
in a number of countries. Broad coalitions of diverse CSOs 
advocating for legislative reform may also help to address the 
stigma associated with receiving foreign funding for work in 
the political sphere.
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A related question is that of how to tap better into rich cultures 
of individual giving when these exist. There is a connection 
here with the participation dimension: our contribution from 
Japanese CSO platform the Japan Association of Charitable 
Organisations suggests that most people who volunteer in 
civil society in Japan also make monetary contributions to 
civil society. In countries that have a growing middle class, 
such as India and some Latin American countries, new 
opportunities to fundraise could be explored. Developing 
better funding links with diaspora communities, exploring the 
applicability of social enterprise models and using technology 
to crowd source funding may also be part of a response.
But despite these possible responses, we may have to accept 
that there seem few sustainable funding success stories, and 
there will always be a funding gap, particularly for CSOs 
that engage in policy, advocacy and human rights work. If 
we believe that having civil society is important, not least 
as a counterbalance to other forces such as government or 
the private sector, we may have to accept that we need to 
ﬁnd ways of resourcing it. It is time to re-open a hard-headed 
conversation about how we ﬁnance the civil society we need.
At least from the point of view of stopping existing cuts in 
CSO funding, in its contribution CONCORD Europe argues 
that measures to address ﬁnancial and ﬁscal crises in donor 
countries should be undertaken in ways that respect existing 
donor ﬁnancial obligations as global actors in international 
development cooperation, minimising the impact of cuts on 
policies and programmes that address their relationship with 
civil society as effective actors in development.
Looking further forward, we need to re-examine donor 
rationales for supporting civil society and their methods for 
doing so. We need to promote the idea that the enhancement 
of the environment for civil society should be built into funding 
decisions, and included in the monitoring and evaluation of 
funding programmes. CSOs involved in the Busan processes 
called for a return to a diversity of funding methods, with 
increased core support for CSOs, including direct funding for 
CSOs in developing countries, innovative mechanisms that 
support CSO-determined priorities, and greater harmonisation 
of transaction costs in funding relationships. We would add to 
this that a greater variety of civil society, going beyond formal 
organisations, should be supported.
The impact on civil society of legislation on the ﬁnancing of terrorism
As Statewatch’s contribution to our report points out, within 
six weeks of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, an opaque 
counter-terrorism ﬁnancing framework had, with little 
debate, been added on top of existing international anti-
money laundering measures, through UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373. Though there is little evidence that CSOs 
are to any signiﬁcant extent being used as fronts for the 
ﬁnancing of terrorism, these measures affect the ability of 
CSOs in developing countries to receive funding and make 
it harder for CSOs in developed countries to connect with 
their developing country partners. For example, extensive 
blacklisting of individuals makes ﬁnancial transfers harder 
and risks reputational damage.
A compliance culture in ﬁnancial institutions obstructs work 
and hampers rapid response, such as to conﬂict and disasters, 
through slowing the movement of resources, while CSO 
compliance itself uses up resources. The multilateral counter-
terrorism ﬁnancing regime has even placed pressure on 
governments to comply. For countries where the environment 
is dysfunctional, such as Turkey, compliance makes things 
worse; for governments that seek to repress civil society, 
countering terrorism ﬁnancing offers another justiﬁcation. 
Domestic legislation on the ﬁnancing of terrorism has been 
used in Nicaragua and Venezuela to question resource ﬂows 
to CSOs and justify their investigation.
Such measures help the designation of ‘terrorist’ to be 
misused, with little pressure on governments to prove 
accusations against individuals or CSOs. This can have a 
chilling effect on CSOs, particularly those that work in 
Islamic countries or undertake peace-building and post-
conﬂict work, which sometimes demands working with 
groups that hold militant views.
Contradiction arose in 2012 when many donor governments 
were keen to support civil society follow up to the Arab 
Spring, but the global counter-terrorism agenda they had 
implemented made the transfer of resources to CSOs in many 
Middle East and North African countries much more difﬁcult
There would seem to be a need in response to advocate for the 
current heavy and blanket approach to countering terrorism 
ﬁnancing to be scaled back, for fundamental rights such as 
freedom of association and expression to be respected, and 
for more transparency and oversight. There is a clear need for 
a full assessment of the impacts caused by current domestic 
and international counter terrorism measures, taking into 
account the real risks and proportionality of these measures, 
and undertake reforms in legislation that would enable the 
legitimate movement of aid and humanitarian ﬁnancing.
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4. Civil society as a dynamic arena
The recent story has not all been about the loss of momentum 
of the Arab Spring, Occupy and the Indignados, and about 
crackdowns on civil society. Protests have burst out in other 
places, such as Bangladesh, Bulgaria and Malaysia, and 
continue to ﬂare in Greece. Arguably, although it has been met 
with attempts at repression, in 2012 we saw a renaissance of 
Russian civil society. A generation that had previously been 
considered rather passive or consumerist and had not before 
engaged in politics or civil society led the movement to push 
back on Putin’s repression. As noted earlier, in India, the anti-
corruption campaign is offered as an example of a broad-
based alliance and movement that achieved impact, while at 
the end of 2012 India also saw spontaneous responses against 
sexual harassment and for the dignity of women, and a strong 
anti-nuclear movement in Tamil Nadu. In March 2013, online 
campaign platform Avaaz announced its 20 millionth member.
Civil society as complex, dynamic arena
The civil society arena is dynamic and different forms of civil 
society experience the enabling environment in different ways. 
It would be difﬁcult, and perhaps wrong, to try to encompass 
them all in one initiative. Our contribution from Brazil hints 
at the complexity of the civil society universe by pointing 
out that cooperatives did not ﬁt into new proposals for more 
progressive regulatory reform in that context because they 
are not non-proﬁts. The emergence of forms such as social 
enterprises, and the difﬁculty some CSOs experience in 
accepting and relating to these hybrid forms, challenges old 
notions of civil society that appear hung up on organisational 
forms and whether organisations make proﬁts.
Our contribution from the Global Fund for Community 
Foundations notes that community foundations – essentially, 
groupings that manage local philanthropic funds to help 
address social improvement needs – are often overlooked 
as part of civil society, and yet they enjoy crucial assets, 
such as their standing in the community and the role they 
play as builders of trust and social capital. What we should 
be encouraged to see in community foundations is the 
application of a local assets-based approach that works 
with what is available from the ground up. With increasing 
hybridisation of civil society forms, we suggest that we should 
accept that each civil society form is capable of utilising 
different assets and makes a contribution in different ways.
An understanding that the civil society arena is ﬂuid and 
dynamic offers both a hope for and a challenge to our 
understanding of the enabling environment. New civil society 
forms evolve to ﬁll emerging social, political and economic 
spaces as governments and private sector shift ground, leave 
gaps, or are found to fail communities. Sometimes established 
CSOs ossify or get left behind by events, including in countries 
that have undergone sudden, dramatic transitions. Where 
conventional CSOs are weak or the environment for them is 
highly disenabling, informal groups, community foundations 
and other such civil society forms may offer alternate spaces 
for voluntary action, as our contributor from the Global Fund 
for Community Foundations suggests:
“CSOs in many countries are witnessing restrictions in their 
space to undertake their work as independent development 
actors, resulting from constraining government policies, 
regulations and political harassment, and the impact of 
onerous conditions attached to ofﬁcial donor aid. In this 
context, new community philanthropy institutions may be 
seen as part of a fresh wave of community level organisations, 
which are contributing to a more enabling environment for 
local CSOs and community initiative. They are doing so through 
helping to develop more inclusive and democratic decision-
making processes, and greater harnessing of local assets and 
resources, rather than a reliance on ideas, money and initiative 
from outside.”
Given this, it is essential that standards for the enabling 
environ ment for civil society, as suggested by our 
recommendations throughout this report, are able adequately 
to capture or encompass new forms, rapid evolutions and the 
civil society activity that goes on under the radar in what 
may otherwise seem disenabling contexts. Standards for 
the enabling environment need to be capable of responding 
to changes in the civil society universe. Further, however 
important the legal, regulatory, policy spheres are for deﬁning 
the environment for civil society, we also need to seek to 
improve the other areas outlined in our report, and to look 
beyond enabling of CSOs to consider wider civil society.
Further, we must resist any deﬁnition of civil society or of 
our enabling conditions set by government regulations and 
external agencies, however progressive these may be; any 
such deﬁnition is likely to become behind the times, and civil 
society itself must own and offer its own deﬁnitions.
Crisis and crossroads?
It could be argued that there is a crisis in civil society. Many 
CSOs will feel that they face difﬁcult, existential questions, 
include those of what they fundamentally stand for, what 
change they seek, and whether their methods are still the best 
ones. Other key questions include those of how civil society 
maintains its autonomy in the face of current global political 
dynamics, and how we in civil society can ensure we continue 
to offer added value without becoming used as an instrument.
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Perhaps a better question to ask is whether civil society has 
ever not been in a crisis, a state of ﬂux, or seeing itself stood 
at a crossroads? Perhaps we should start to recognise this 
as healthy and begin to understand volatility, ﬂux and self-
criticism as key attributes of civil society that enable it to be 
a trusted, diverse and self-critical source of alternatives and 
solutions, and a locus for self-expression, dialogue and the 
pursuit of public good.
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5. Looking forward
As civil society, we have an uphill battle to ﬁght. We know we 
have impact, even though sometimes we struggle to prove it. 
Our progressive voices build social cohesion, trust, tolerance, 
civic participation and cooperation. We provide solutions, 
results, innovations and ideas. We deliver development. 
We know that we enrich the daily lives of people and help 
empower the poor, vulnerable and marginalised. We know that 
in turn we have a right to the optimal legal, political and social 
environment, the communications infrastructure and ﬁnancial 
conditions that enable us to do our work as well as we can.
The unfortunate reality may be that sometimes we are so 
close to our work that we cannot see that its value is not 
clear to all. The value that civil society brings always needs to 
be proved, documented and promoted – and the argument 
for civil society continually made. As contributors Jacqueline 
Wood and Karin Fällman state:
“While the assumption of the need for strong government and 
private sectors is today generally not questioned, the need for 
a strong civil society is not always so readily assumed.”
Similarly, the value resulting to society as a whole of a 
more enabling environment for civil society still needs to 
be demonstrated by civil society in many different contexts. 
CSOs and individuals in civil society, in their full diversity, need 
to help reveal the essential value of civil society and people’s 
participation. We must encourage governments, donors, the 
public and civil society ourselves to expand perceptions of 
civil society, in order to truly understand and acknowledge 
civil society’s social, political and economic impact. We also 
have to take all possible steps to be effective and strengthen 
our collective accountability, thereby making a strong case 
for a more enabling environment.
In working in this area, we in civil society must be honest, be 
prepared to admit our failures, and be leaders of best practice. 
At the same time, we must promote the intrinsic value of 
civil society, beyond its instrumental value, and we must be 
conﬁdent in asserting our autonomy and our right to make 
our own deﬁnitions, including of the enabling environment. 
We need to redeﬁne the terms of the debate and not let 
governments and donors deﬁne these for us. Nor must we 
let ourselves be defensively deﬁned by our reactions to our 
critics. Our autonomy also implies that we need to improve 
our research capacities and develop our own data, and to 
liberate ourselves from our current funding models. These are 
steps towards our empowerment and developing the enabling 
environment we deserve.
The enabling environment is necessarily complex and 
dynamic, and we need to accept that it is this way, and not 
try to build rigid models. We need to acknowledge nuance, 
complexity and context-speciﬁc dynamics, and afﬁrm the 
value of local knowledge and local action. But we also need 
to simplify when possible by prioritising our actions, and by 
looking for areas of gain and opportunity, and the possibilities 
for collaboration, which may be different in each context. We 
need to identify and work to build on our existing assets and 
search for emerging opportunities and tipping points. Above 
all, we must work collaboratively, and encompass different 
civil society forms, including new ones as they arise, and act 
in solidarity. In doing so we will prove the value, and values, of 
civil society as a whole.
Collaborative strategies
In closing, we suggest the following as collaborative strategies 
for civil society that will help us take the next steps forward:
1. We should identify and share successful and innovative 
practices pioneered by civil society, governments, donors 
and the private sector that improve the conditions for civil 
society, and in doing so, improve society as a whole.
2. We should recognise that as civil society we have a 
key role to play in helping to establish our enabling 
environment. We should work together to nurture the 
internal conditions that give civil society the best possible 
grounds to seek a more enabling environment, such as 
enhancing our legitimacy, transparency and accountability; 
strengthening the connections and cooperation between 
different forms of civil society; adopting effective tools of 
communication; and demonstrating our impact and our 
intrinsic, autonomous value.
3. We should be strategic. We need to focus on levers and 
key moments during which we can exercise pressure, and 
when due to external factors such as reputational risk, 
governments and donors will be more amenable to our 
demands.
4. We should mobilise multi-stakeholder networks of like-
minded civil society actors and friendly governments and 
donors in our efforts to lobby for the implementation 
of legislative reform and optimal funding and political 
conditions for civil society.
5. We should forge civil society coalitions that work at a range 
of levels and that utilise the different strengths of different 
partners. These should combine the strengths some have 
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within their countries with the strengths others have in the 
multilateral arena, and should utilise the assets, including 
the constituencies and reach, of different civil society forms.
6. Finally, we should acknowledge that we still have to win 
arguments. In making our arguments, we need to be more 
ambitious, and to aim higher. We need to drive up standards, 
and set ever-rising minimum standards and norms.
We believe the time is ripe to seek enabling conditions for 
civil society: partly because we see some momentum around 
political acceptance of the importance of improving civil 
society conditions, not least in international development 
effectiveness processes; and partly because we see there 
is a need, with too many examples being offered by 
our contributors of disenabling conditions. The external 
environment within which we in civil society seek to make 
change is inﬂuenced by many forces, and in multiple ways 
disenabling conditions are affecting our abilities to achieve 
our maximum contributions. It is time to demand more, so 
that we can achieve more.
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